Object cases in Old English: What do they encode?

A contribution to a general theory of case and grammatical relations

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March 1981

The Function of Object Cases, especially in Old English

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0. Introduction

This paper is intended as a contribution to a general theory of case and grammatical
relations. Its aim is to examine the common assumption (common at least in analyses
of Standard Average European case languages) that certain cases, usually called
accusative and dative, are used to encode the grammatical relations of direct
and indirect object. The presuppositions of this assumption, viz. that 'direct' and
'indirect object' are well-defined concepts and that these two kinds of objects
can be differentiated in all particular languages alike, ░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░
░░░░░░░░░ are by no means trivial. What the evidence from a variety of languages
░░░░░░░░░░░ suggests, rather, is that even if genuinely grammatical core relations
such as subject, direct and indirect object can be characterised in universal
grammar (rather than only in the grammars of particular languages), this does
not imply that these potential ░░░░░░░░ categories are utilised in each individual
language. An attempt will be made, therefore, to specify the conditions under
which languages qualify as (direct/indirect) object-differentiating, and under which
object case marking must be recognised as relationally determined. Since, as a
result of the conceptual analysis of the categories 'direct/indirect object' suggested
here, we grant the logical possibility of human languages not manifesting both
direct and indirect objects, we have to explore what else certain cases (in particular
those commonly known as accusative and dative) may encode if they do not encode
genuinely grammatical object relations. It is ░░░░░░░ no novel observation that
the distribution of case markers may be contingent on a variety of factors: even
in languages where both direct and indirect objects are traditionally recognised,
various semantic, pragmatic, and non-relational grammatical factors are often
mentioned as determining or at least influencing the choice of object cases. Our
aim will be to examine possible generalisations underlying case-marking rules not
referring to grammatical relations (in particular, generalisations based on the notions
of transitivity and of degrees of opposedness of actants), and to determine to what
extent the eventual differentiation of direct and indirect objects can be based on
these general notions.

In spite of the general and typological orientation of this paper, its empirical
focus will be on a single language, Old English. The analysis of the Old English

dative-accusative case opposition suggested here is undertaken in the hope of shedding some light on notoriously intractable aspects of the syntax and morphology of this older Germanic language; this language-particular analysis is, however, presented as illustrative of the more general issues confronting a typologically adequate theory of object-differentiation and case marking.

1. Preliminary remark concerning the secondariness of objects

It would seem intuitively plausible to assume that the grammatical relation of object presupposes that of subject, or, in the conceptual framework elaborated elsewhere (cp. Plank 1979a, 1980a, 1985) that only subjective predicates can have objects, irrespective of the actual presence of an overt subject. Accordingly, all semantic roles in a clause which are not singled out for the primary grammatical relation of subject would be in an object relation, 'object' thus being a grammatical rather than a purely semantic relation by virtue of its negative pragmatic potential: subjects are predestined to acquire pragmatic primehood status (e.g. to be chosen as focus of attention or as point of view), objects are not. Presumably it is this inherently underprivileged pragmatic status which Hugo Schuchardt (1920:462) had in mind when characterising objects as follows: "jedes Objekt ist ein in den Schatten gerücktes Subjekt". Still, it might be premature to conclude that grammatical object relations can only be defined relative to the primary grammatical relation of subject, and that neutral, non-subjective predicates (i.e. predicates not singling out one argument as preferred pragmatic primary) therefore cannot govern object relations, but only purely semantic roles. Pragmatic primehood privileges may not be the only factor responsible for the constitution of genuinely grammatical relations (as will be argued later, they do not seem ████ crucial, for instance, as far as the differentiation of direct and indirect objects is concerned), and we could accordingly be forced to recognise different grammatical relations even if these are not "in den Schatten gerückt" vis à vis a subject.[1] Although the possibility ought not be excluded a priori that both subjective and non-subjective predicates may occur with arguments in non-subject grammatical relations, I would still maintain, however, that there is an essential difference between non-subjects under these two circumstances: in the one case (i.e. with subjective predicates), the object

relations are non-primary relations, whereas in the other case (i.e. with prag-
matically neutral predicates), there can be no secondary grammatical relation
since there is no primary relation to begin with. In what follows, I shall not pur-
sue these considerations in more detail; although my account of direct and indirect
objects as grammatical relations may occasionally seem biased towards the view
that objects are non-primary, I hope it is general enough to be also applicable
to non-subjective languages, if any of these turned out to differentiate non-subject
grammatical relations.

2. Differentiating objects semantically and pragmatically

2.1. That languages should be able to do without the distinct grammatical relations
of direct and indirect object ought to be quite easy to imagine for someone familiar
with so-called case grammar. Given semantic-role configurations such as agent-
-patient-instrument, experiencer-stimulus, agent-patient-recipient (also known as
beneficiary or addressee) etc., and probably given that one of the roles in each
of these configurations has acquired the status of subject on account of its pragmatic
privileges, the non-subjects could then be distinguished as patient-objects,
recipient-objects, instrument-objects and the like, without any need to recognise
further relational-grammatic distinctions. The labels 'direct' and 'indirect' object
would surely be conceptually redundant if they were to be employed for the sole
purpose of distinguishing patient and recipient objects respectively. Fillmore (1968)
seems to be aware of this danger of terminological profusion: he apparently does not
consider (direct-)objectivalisation obligatory ("objectivalization, where it occurs",
1968:49), and this surely implies that '(direct) object' is not regarded as a category
necessarily definable for each predicate co-occurring with two or more 'case' roles.
As long as the grammatical and possibly lexical patterns and processes of a language
can be accounted for in terms of semantic roles in a maximally general manner, further
terminological distinctions are superfluous and, as a matter of principle, ought to be
avoided in the interest of perspicuity.

Now suppose we encounter a language where experiencer-objects pattern with
recipient-objects and differently from patient-objects with respect to a number of
grammatical processes (such as case marking, linear ordering, verb agreement, pragmatic
status (re-)assignment, etc.), would this be reason enough to supplement relational-semantic

structures by a level of genuinely grammatical relations where the roles of experiencer and recipient are collapsed and thus opposed to the patient role? I think not, or at least not necessarily. In an earlier paper dealing with subjects (Plank 1980) I have argued that semantic relations which are distinct at the level of case-grammar-style role types may nevertheless have a common relational-semantic denominator; and that an analogous solution may be available in the case of recipients and experiencers will become clear in §§ 2.3 and 3, where it will be shown that argument configurations can be differentiated semantically according to their degree of opposedness, with a tendency for recipients and experiencers to be less polarly opposed to subjects/agents than prototypical patients. Examples like (1) and (2), furthermore, suggest that roles such as those of patient and recipient cannot a priori be regarded as semantically absolutely distinct,

(1) a. I dealt Smith a blow

b. I hit Smith

(2) a. I gave the flowers water

b. I watered the flowers

for if one assumes that Smith and the flowers denote recipients in (1a) and (2a), and patients in (1b) and (2b), it is obvious that these role differences do not correspond to any differences in the situations described by these predications, but rather are due to their particular linguistic renderings. Thus, it may turn out to depend on what kinds of predicates are found in a language whether it is legitimate to distinguish certain role types (such as patient and recipient) in the first place.

Disregarding for the moment potential problems of role-type identification, we can often observe that certain roles are encoded differently in a language depending on semantic properties of the respective referents, such as humanness or animacy (as for instance in Spanish, cp. (3)[2]); on semantic factors such as degree of involvement of the referent (as for instance in Russian (4) or Polish (5)); on the pragmatic status of the referents in these roles (as for instance in Turkish (6), where definiteness is crucial); or also on certain morphosyntactic features of the respective arguments, such as nominal or pronominal character (as for instance in French (7)) or, quite trivially, declension class membership of the head noun (as for instance in Old English (8)).

(3) a. Busco mi sombrero 'I seek my hat'

b. Busco a mi amigo 'I seek my friend'

(4) a. <u>Peredajte me xleb!</u> 'pass me the bread (Nom/Acc)!'

    b. <u>Peredajte me xleba!</u> 'pass me (some (of the)) bread (Gen)!'

(5) a. <u>Oglądałem ten film</u> 'I saw this film (Acc)'

    b. <u>Nie oglądałem tego filmu</u> 'I didn't see this film (Gen)'

(6) a. <u>Bir öküz aldı</u> 'an ox (Absolute form) he-bought'

    b. <u>Öküz-ü aldı</u> 'the-ox (Acc) he-bought'

(7) a. <u>Le professeur donne un livre à l'élève</u>

    b. <u>Le professeur lui donne un livre</u>

(8)   <u>He Gode/(ðam) suna/guman/menn/fæder þancode</u> 'he thanked God/the son/

man/man/father' (different Dative forms depending on declension class of noun)

Would such differences in encoding, then, be a sufficient criterion for us to introduce
grammatically distinct object relations? The answer here must again be negative because
in order to formulate the respective rules of encoding/we [as such] do not need to refer to concepts
other than the (morpho-)syntactic, semantic and/or pragmatic ones mentioned. That is,
to posit further distinctions than those between human and non-human, totally and partly
(or not at all) affected, definite and indefinite, nominal and pronominal, and de-
clension-class x and declension-class y patient-objects (or, as the case may be,
stimulus- or recipient-objects) would be another instance of creating conceptual
redundancy. It remains to be empirically determined whether in languages with such
differential encoding other grammatical/lexical rules and patterns can also be stated
in terms of these same morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic factors, or whether
for purposes other than those of relational encoding the conceptual apparatus so far
recognised would have to be elaborated.

If we now consider sentence pairs like those in (9), we might assume that the
situation in principle is not much different here.

(9) a. <u>They presented a duckling to the farmer</u>

    b. <u>They presented the farmer with a duckling</u>

Each time the English verb <u>to present</u> has two objects differing only by virtue of the
semantic roles played by the respective arguments (perhaps recipient and patient, the
latter being the entity changing hands), each of these roles being encodable in more
than one way (recipient: preposition <u>to</u> and normally post-patient position (9a), or no
preposition and postverbal position (9b); patient: no preposition and normally postverbal

position (9a), or preposition <u>with</u> and post-recipient position (9b)). Only the encoding
alternatives in this case would not seem to be contingent on semantic or pragmatic
properties of the arguments in the two roles,[3] but rather the encoding of one object
is contingent on that of the other: if the recipient takes a preposition, the patient
cannot take one too, and vice versa (cp. 9c), and at least one object must take a
preposition (cp. 9d).

(9) c. *<u>They presented to the farmer with a duckling/*... with a duckling to</u>

<u>the farmer</u>

d. *<u>They presented the farmer a duckling</u>[4]/*... <u>a duckling the farmer</u>

The rules of linearisation, and perhaps other grammatical rules (e.g. passive), could
then be stated so as to differentiate objects in terms of their encoding (i.e. non-
-prepositional objects usually precede prepositional objects; only non-prepositional
objects are accessible to passivisation), rather than in terms of their semantic roles.

If we decided to call non-prepositional objects 'direct', and prepositional objects 'non-
-direct'   (or perhaps 'oblique'), would this again amount to gratuitous terminological
proliferation? Fillmore (1968), for instance, thinks it would not, and suggests that
the prepositionless objects in constructions like (9a-b), and also those co-occurring with
simple one-object verbs like <u>kill</u>, <u>see</u>, <u>own</u>, etc., indeed have something in
common apart from lacking prepositions: direct objects, regardless of their semantic
roles, are, 'superficially', in "closer association with the verb" than non-direct
objects (1968:47). It is true, if we distinguish objects only in terms of semantic
roles, semantic, pragmatic, and morphosyntactic argument properties, and perhaps
overt encoding, we could not (or at least not automatically) account for the additional distinctive parameter of
the superficially more or less close association of an object with the predicate, which
Fillmore apparently believes to be the essential criterion of the grammatical relation
of direct (vis-à-vis non-direct) objects.   The question then is whether this parameter
in fact has to be taken into account, and this requires that we figure out what it
really means for an object to be superficially closely associated with the predicate,
since this concept is anything but self-explanatory. Apparently it cannot simply be
taken to mean that the less close, hence non-direct, object is more easily omissible.
Although one object could indeed seem to be omissible with a predicate such as <u>present</u>
(cp. <u>At the exhibition they presented a zebra-striped duckling</u>, presupposing that
this really is the same predicate as that occurring in (9)), no object is omissible if
<u>present</u> is employed as in (9b), where the argument role that may lack overt ex-

pression under certain circumstances is supposed to be in the direct-object relation.

Attempts to *differentiate degrees of* closeness of association, on a less 'superficial' level perhaps, in terms of implications between predicates and semantic argument roles appear to be equally unsuccessful in the case of predicates like present: the meaning of this predicate is such as to imply the (at least conceptual) presence of both a receiver and an entity to be received — none of the two seems more strongly implied. Further, the objects purportedly in closer association with the predicate lack segmental relational encoding (i.e., in Modern English, prepositions); but this common coding property cannot be taken to explicate the concept 'direct (or close) object' since we would expect, on the contrary, that we can already make use of this concept in formulating, and applying, the rules of encoding. Interestingly, Fillmore (1968:47), like others before him, emphasises the formal rather than purely notional character of direct objects in connection with the observation that in the encoding of direct objects semantic-role (i.e. notional) distinctions appear to be neutralised. However, in opposing formal (grammatical) to notional (semantic) relations as corresponding to the grammatical distinction of direct and non-direct object relations, one does not yet answer the question of what criteria must be fulfilled for a formal, direct-object, relation to be definable. Why, for example, should the relation holding between a duckling and present be regarded as formal rather than purely notional in (9a), but as purely notional rather than formal in (9b)? Because a duckling is superficially in closer association with the verb in (9a) than it is in (9b)? We would thus end up with the concept of close(r) association, which itself has yet to be given a more precise characterisation, as criterial for direct-objecthood. And we would also have to ask why it is that objects more closely associated with a predicate are in a relation which is formal rather than purely notional. We can of course assume, with Fillmore and others (cp. Dik 1978, ch.5), a hierarchical order of semantic roles, where the highest-ranking of the semantic roles remaining after subjectivalisation has to be chosen as direct object, allowing for the possibility of individual predicates modifying or prohibiting this general object selection procedure. But the situation is worse here than in the case of subject selection in accordance with a semantic-role hierarchy. In the case of subjects, it is possible to find a rationale for the hierarchical role ordering, having to do with the inherent pragmatic primehood potential of the most typical role players, and the category 'subject' itself is no arbitrary label but can

(the handwritten marginalia at top)

(c.p. Plank 1979a, 1980a, 1985)

be defined, non-redundantly, as lexically preferred pragmatic primary. As to

objects, stating that the direct object is, with certain provisos (e.g. given that

objectivalisation indeed takes place), the semantic role next on the hierarchy,

is so far rather tautological *because* there is no ~~self-explanatory~~ rationale for a

hierarchical role ordering with respect to object selection and no independent

characterisation of the status ('direct object') *for which* the next highest role is to be selected.

After what has been said above, the obvious remedy would seem to be the

notion of closeness of association: it might be that semantic roles can be ordered

not only according to their pragmatic primehood potential but also with respect

to their potential of being more or less closely associated with predicates.

Individual predicates could then ~~~~ select ~~~~ one role among those

present as the actual closest associate — e.g., the patient in (9a), or the recipient

in (9b), the latter perhaps in violation of the generally preferred order which ranks

patients above recipients . What makes this option unsatisfactory is ~~~~ that

the notion 'closeness of association' *is* yet *unc*larified. Another option,

not relying on closeness of association per se, would be to provide a pragmatic

motivation for direct-object selection in analogy to subjectivalisation. Those

semantic roles would accordingly be assigned the status 'direct object' which

the respective predicates prefer as pragmatic secondaries (presupposing a scalar

rather than binary conception of the relevant pragmatic primehood parameters),[5]

or, alternatively, which the respective predicates prefer as anti-primaries (e.g.

as commentative constituent rather than as secondary focus of attention). These

latter options could in a way account for the impression of a formal rather than

notional nature of the direct-object relation. What direct objects would have in

common according to them is their particular pragmatic status, which is to some

extent independent of their semantic-role identity. The crucial question, then, is

empirical: Is direct object, in the languages where this category is traditionally

recognised and demonstrably necessary, really a pragmatic category in either of

the interpretations suggested here? For instance, is the overt morphosyntactic

difference between (9a) and (9b) really due to a difference in informational- and/or

indexical-pragmatic organisation? And if so, can the morphosyntax of such English

constructions be accounted for simply in terms of two structural levels, those of

semantic roles and pragmatic statuses, or do such constructions require an additional structural level, that of grammatical relations, including in particular a notion of direct object ('lexically preferred secondary/comment')? And a further question would be what the pragmatics of objecthood has to do with the closeness of verb-object associations.

Rather than taking up such questions ~~called in the preceding paragraph~~ immediately, largely negative

let me point out briefly, in conclusion of this section, what I believe to be the main reason for introducing an additional relational concept of 'direct object' when semantic roles or 'cases' are assumed as one's descriptive point of departure — a reason which is ~~often~~ often rationalised in terms of 'closeness of association' or 'formality rather than notionality of a relation'. In many languages one commonly observes that different semantic roles, even if apparently lacking any common semantic denominator, nevertheless exhibit identical morphosyntactic behaviour (including identical overt encoding). More specifically, whereas certain roles which are often characterised as circumstantial (such as temporal and local setting and instrument with predicates denoting activities) are to some extent kept distinct morphosyntactically, other, non-circumstantial roles are not so differentiated for the purpose of morphosyntactic rules. With a certain class of predicates ('transitives'), there seems to exist a uniform morphosyntactic pattern insofar as one argument is treated the same with all these predicates irrespective of its semantic role and irrespective of the presence of further semantic roles. This paradigmatic identification of semantic roles, where it occurs, can perhaps be explained in terms of economy (cp. Plank 1979b, 1980b). 1983

Maximal,

morphosyntactic differentiation of different roles in different clauses is not really necessary in order to avoid relational ambiguities most of the time; as long as the co-occurring roles are merely overtly distinguished in a regular manner without any overt signals of role identities as such, it will usually be possible to infer, on the basis of predicate and argument meanings, the roles played by the arguments present. (For instance, in order to find out that the arguments immediately following English verbs such as kill and see in unmarked declarative clauses represent patients and stimuli respectively, no distinct patient and stimulus role markers are necessary, this role difference being inferable on the basis of the verb meanings.) At any rate, if absolutely distinct semantic roles happen to be paradigmatically identified in morpho-syntax, it is clear that such patterns cannot be accounted for in terms of the original semantic roles alone. An addition to the conceptual repertoire seems called for: we

could designate as 'direct objects' all those roles showing this identical morpho-
syntactic behaviour, at least if this common patterning cannot be demonstrated to be due
to other, especially pragmatic, common properties of the respective arguments.

It is no doubt legitimate to introduce, non-redundantly, a concept of a direct-object
relation, as opposed to non-direct, i.e. ▓▓▓ semantic-role relations, in this manner.
What cannot be shown, however, by observing patterns of paradigmatic role
identification is why such patterns as the ones observed should exist rather than
others. We are, along these lines, essentially observing symptoms without asking
what they are symptoms of. The principle of economy might help explain why
paradigmatic role identification, at the expense of the semantic transparency of
relational morphosyntax, takes place at all; it certainly cannot explain the particular
identificational patterns found. From the point of view of economy, it would be as economical,
for,   or instruments
(instance,   to treat stimuli of verbs of experience like local settings/of verbs of
activity as to identify stimuli with patients. Thus, if the notion of direct object is to be
based   on the identical behaviour of distinct semantic roles, it remains to be determined
what might motivate the specific patterns of identification. And here we are back with
notions such as 'closeness of association between verb and object' suggested by Fill-
                              are said to
more and others: certain semantic roles)pattern alike morphosyntactically because
they share the property of being in close association with verbs, specifically with verbs
of a particular kind commonly labelled 'transitives'. The employment of such notions
is clear evidence of the recognition that the observation of paradigmatic role identifications
per se does not suffice to explicate the category 'direct object'. But it is equally clear
that more attention must be focused on the notions of 'closeness of association' and
'transitivity' in turn if these are to possess true explanatory force.

2.2. The notion of transitivity has traditionally played a major role in distinguishing
kinds of objects (and, of course, of verbs). That it has often been employed in a rather
circular manner, si-

multaneously motivating and being motivated by overt coding patterns involving,
for instance, object case marking or verbal conjugations, should not prevent us
from appreciating its potential significance. If transitivity is defined in semantic
or notional terms as referring to the 'carrying over' or 'transferring' or 'passing
over' of an action or its effect, expressed by the predicate, from the agent or source
to the patient, recipient, or goal,[6] it ought to be an appropriate basis for con-
ceptualising relational regularities. What remains to be seen is whether the notion
of transitivity allows a specification of genuinely grammatical relations such as
direct and indirect object.

It has been assumed (most recently by Hopper & Thompson 1980) that transitivity
is primarily a semantic property of clauses, and that it is a complex rather than a
primitive property analysable into a number of factors contributing to the overall
degree of transitivity of a clause. According to this view, which does not seem im-
plausible in principle, a clause increases in semantic transitivity (a) if it describes
a situation as dynamic rather than as static, specifically if its predicate denotes an
action rather than, say, an experience or a state; (b) if there are two or more
participant roles involved, i.e. overtly represented or at least understood, rather
than only one or even none at all; and also if there are as many participants as there
are participant roles suggested by the predicate, rather than one participant being
involved in more than one capacity (as with reflexives and reciprocals); (c) if the
entities referred to by the arguments of the predicate are (referentially or inherently)
highly individuated rather than non-individuated;[7] (d) if the most active participant
is seen as wilfully responsible for and in deliberate control of what is happening to
his/her/its opposite number, rather than being regarded as an unintentional, in-
voluntary, inadvertent, unwitting and automatic actant; (e) if the inactive, or not
so active, participant in turn is thoroughly and completely rather than only partly or
not at all affected or effected; (f) if the situation is represented as perfective (telic)
rather than imperfective (atelic); (g) if the 'Aktionsart' is punctual rather than durative;
(h) if the propositional content of the clause is affirmed rather than denied; (i) if a
state of affairs is represented as real rather than imagined, wished-for, (im-)possible
etc., or, briefly, in a realis rather than an irrealis mode. The following English
examples are intended to illustrate each of these transitivity factors; the clauses to

the left of the greater-than sign are semantically more transitive than those to the
right with respect to the individual transitivity factor illustrated.

(10) a. The farmer killed/chased the duckling > The farmer liked/resembled/saw
the duckling

b. The barber shaved him > The barber shaved (himself) > The barber died

c. Smith played the ball to mid-on > They played cricket/football/piano

d. The farmer grew/bought tomatoes > He lost/forgot the tomatoes
(ambiguous: The barber frightened the farmer)

e. He drank the beer > He drank (some) beer

f. He ate up the meal > He was eating the meal

g. The farmer kicked the duckling > The farmer carried the duckling

h. I've seen this film > I've not seen this film

i. He killed the duckling > He would like to kill the duckling, if only he
could find it

Languages may well differ with respect to which of these partly binary, partly scalar
distinctions are morphosyntactically relevant; they are unlikely to differ, though,
with respect to which values of the features just summarised count as increasing or
diminishing the degree of semantic transitivity. The empirical claim thus is that there
is a natural affinity between perfectivity, punctuality, prototypical agenthood
(volition, responsibility, control) and patienthood (thorough affectedness/effected-
ness), individuality of participants etc., which may become morphosyntactically
manifest if a language encodes the respective features individually or collectively,
whereas opposite correlations, e.g. between perfectivity, punctuality, non-individuation,
and partial rather than total affectedness of the non-agent, are not to be expected.
Semantic transitivity is a notion defined independently of particular languages,
and objects, therefore, are universally differentiable according to the degree of
transitivity of the clause in which they occur — which, it appears, is still an essentially
semantic differentiation, although transitivity differences may of course show morpho-
syntactically.

If we now reconsider the above English examples, we note that the morpho-
syntactic expression of objects is hardly sensitive to any differences in the degree
of transitivity of these clauses: with the partial exception of objects in low-transitivity reflexive
clauses (he shaved (himself)), all objects are encoded alike irrespective of the relatively

high or low degree of transitivity of their clauses. However, it was already pointed out above that the universal notion of semantic transitivity does not imply that all rules referring to objects in any language must be sensitive to any differences in clausal transitivity. The implication is rather that if rules indeed are sensitive to such differences, they will follow a universally definable pattern, with less transitive clauses (such as those corresponding to the English examples to the right of the $>$-sign above) sharing morphosyntactic features (concerning, for instance, object case marking or verbal conjugation class) not shared by more transitive clauses. Still, in order to be able to distinguish languages like Modern English, where in the expression of objects in simple active clauses differences in semantic transitivity appear to be neutralised to a considerable extent, from languages with object-related rules/patterns which are more sensitive to transitivity, [8] one could introduce a language-particular category of direct object, which would have to reflect which semantic transitivity factors or degrees are relevant for the differentiation of object types in the languages concerned. Modern English would thus be characterised as a language where direct objects may still occur in clauses with a relatively low degree of transitivity; in other languages (e.g. languages with object marking patterns like those illustrated in (3)-(6)) direct-objecthood may be restricted to clauses with much higher degrees of transitivity, with non-direct (which supposedly includes indirect) objects occurring in clauses whose transitivity value is below a certain language-particular threshold.

Notice, incidentally, that finer differences in transitivity are by no means entirely irrelevant for Modern English morphosyntax. That transitivity is certainly an important covert category shows in a number of ways. For instance, predicates like those in (11) preferably take plain rather than 'prepositional' objects if the clause is intended to be highly transitive.

(11) jump (over), swim (across), shoot (at), kick (towards), inhabit/live in, hear (of/about) ...

Constraints on passivisation like those illustrated in (12) can all be accounted for in terms of transitivity: the less transitive certain clauses are, the more they tend to resist passivisation (cp. Tuyn 1970, Bolinger 1977).

(12) a. The duckling was killed/?*liked/*resembled by the farmer

    b. The ball was played to mid-on by Smith/*Cricket was played by Smith

    c. The farmer was frightened by the barber (unambiguous; cp. with the
ambiguous active version in (10d))

    d. I was approached by a stranger/*by a train

    e. This bed has been slept in by Queen Victoria/*Last night my bed was slept
in by Bill

Transitivity features (individuation/animacy, thorough involvement) also appear to underlie
the constraints on 'dative movement' and other object rearrangements illustrated in (13):

    (13) a. He wrote me/*Australia a letter

    b. He taught his students Old English (*but they didn't learn any)

    c. They loaded the lorry with buttons/*with two buttons

'Transitive' adjectives like those in (14) tend to be employed in preference to
corresponding verbs if the clause is intended as less transitive (cp. König
1971, and Blinkenberg 1960, ch. 13, for French analogues):

    (14) indicative of, afraid of, fond of, apprehensive of, suggestive of, deserving
of, inclusive of ...

In general, if the categories of adjective and verb can be distinguished in a language,
adjectives are typically employed in less transitive and verbs in more transitive clauses.
And in view of the categorial meaning of adjectives (static rather than dynamic) it is not surprising that the objects
of adjectival predicates tend to be encoded differently from 'direct' (i.e. highly transitive)
objects of verbs (cp. the dative/genitive and prepositional, rather than accusative
and purely positional, marking of adjectival objects in Old and Modern English re-
spectively: lað/disagreeable to, hold/loyal to, leof/dear to, nydbeðearf/necessary to or for,
georn/eager for etc.). Thus, there can be no doubt that morphosyntactic manifestations of
the notion of semantic transitivity can be found even in Modern English, regardless
of the fact that the encoding of objects in active one-object clauses in this language
is not particularly sensitive to differences in transitivity.

So far we have seen that a language-particular morphosyntactic category 'direct
object' can perhaps be motivated in terms of semantic transitivity, direct objects being
those uniformly encoded and uniformly behaving objects which occur in clauses whose
overall transitivity value is above a certain language-particular threshold. But notice
that we have so far only considered clauses with a single object. If we now turn to

clauses with more than two semantic roles governed by their predicates, we encounter

a problem. Traditionally, direct and non-direct/indirect objects have been distinguished

paradigmatically, i.e. as types of objects characteristically occurring in different

clause types (e.g. with different classes of predicates),[10] as well as syntagmatically,

i.e. in clauses with two or more objects. However, how can two objects occurring

in a single clause differ in transitivity if transitivity, as has been suggested here, is

a property of the clause as a whole? Since a number of the above-mentioned semantic

transitivity factors specifically concern objects themselves rather than the subject, the

predicate, or entire clauses, one could try and figure out which object in two-object

clauses contributes more to the overall clausal degree of transitivity. This is in fact

the strategy adopted by Hopper & Thompson (1980:§ 2.3), who conclude that the

arguments known as 'indirect objects' in Standard Average European languages are

more transitive than 'direct objects' in two-object clauses since they tend to be

highly individuated (i.e. to be animate if not human, and definite), which according

to Hopper & Thompson is characteristic of direct objects in highly transitive one-object

clauses. And indeed there are numerous languages, Bantu and other,[11] where

recipient or beneficiary objects in two-object clauses, which thus correspond semantically to

the allegedly 'indirect' objects of Standard Average European, pattern like bona fide

direct objects in highly transitive one-object clauses with respect to encoding and

perhaps other grammatical rules, at least if they outrank the co-occurring patient

objects in individuation. For example, in Sesotho, the Bantu language discussed by

Morolong & Hyman (1977), if the two objects in a two-object clause differ in animacy

and/or definiteness, the more animate (human)/definite object immediately follows

the verb and determines verbal concord, irrespective of the semantic roles of the

two objects. But even in the light of such patterns, and of course if we accept that

transitivity can be directly attributed to objects themselves rather than to entire

clauses, Hopper & Thompson's conclusion still seems to be somewhat arbitrary since

they are here completely neglecting another of their transitivity factors, viz. total

involvement (affectedness/effectedness), which would clearly single out as more

transitive, at least if the clause as a whole is highly transitive, the object usually

called 'direct'. If the traditional characterisation of transitivity in terms of the

carrying/passing over of an action or its effect is to make sense, it should surely

apply to what (or, less frequently, who) is given/shown/written/sold/sent/told in

the case of three-place predicates like 'give', 'show', 'write', 'sell', 'send', 'tell', rather than to the recipient. Note, for instance, that if a language has some object-related marking to signal the object-referent's degree of involvement (cp. e.g. the partitive case in Finnish or the genitive in Slavic (see 4 and 5 above)), [12] it will be the direct (patient) object in one- as well as in two-object clauses, rather than the direct object in one-object clauses and the 'indirect' (recipient/beneficiary) object in two-object clauses, which is marked as less transitive if the whole clause is less transitive on the in- volvement criterion (e.g. under negation, with incompletive aspect, etc.). And note also that recipient/beneficiary ('indirect') objects of three-place predicates, unlike a good deal of direct objects of two-place predicates, can never be effected objects. Thus, in conclusion, the concept of clausal semantic transitivity seems incapable of motivating an unambiguous and universally valid decision about the more or less transitive status of those objects in two-object clauses which are traditionally distinguished, at least in Standard Average European, as 'direct' and 'indirect': some transitivity factors (individuation) appear to be more typically associated with 'indirect' (recipient/beneficiary) objects in such clauses, others (degree of involvement) with 'direct' (patient) objects. If different languages turn out to organise their two-object clauses differently, this cannot simply be seen as a matter of different morphosyntactically recognised thresholds of a universally invariant transitivity scale. At any rate, if we observe that the two objects in two-object clauses of a language are morphosyntactically differentiated according to some transitivity factors, we cannot yet conclude that direct and non-direct/indirect objects are being differentiated as truly grammatical relations. What can be achieved along these lines is essentially only a differentiation of semantic and/or pragmatic types of objects, since the transitivity criteria employed are semantic (relational and other) and pragmatic (individuation, partly based on referentiality), even in the case of language-particular specifications of what transitivity factors are to count as relevant for the expression and grammatical behaviour of objects. Like semantic-role differentiation, semantic/pragmatic transitivity differentiation per se is no sufficient reason for the recognition of grammatically distinct object relations. Even if we grant that semantic/pragmatic transitivity as such is a universally valid dimension, we cannot be surprised, therefore, about

the discovery of languages where in two-or-more-object clauses two or more

arguments can be construed in the same grammatical relation (which might be

labeled, arbitrarily, 'direct object') regardless of their different semantic-role

relations and of their different contributions to the overall clausal transitivity

value.[13] Such languages, on the contrary, empirically justify the conclusion

that an appeal to semantic/pragmatic transitivity alone is not enough to define

two different, genuinely grammatical object relations in two-or-more-object

clauses. Thus, the essence and the rationale of the syntagmatic differentiation

of direct and non-direct/indirect objects as grammatical relations, in case a further, not purely

nor purely pragmatic, *viable and*

semantic|structural level proves/necessary in particular languages, must be sought

elsewhere.

2.3. Having outlined some possibilities and limitations of the notion of transitivity

(without referring to the familiar concepts of transitive and intransitive verbs as

such), it could prove instructive to call to mind what other principles are often

assumed to underlie object-case assignments in Standard Average European case

languages, in particular in those where an accusative case is ~~traditionally~~ associated

(perhaps among other things) with the direct object relation, and a dative, and per-

haps also genitive, case with the indirect object relation. As we are still trying to

reconstruct the conditions under which it makes sense to differentiate direct and

indirect objects as genuinely grammatical relations, we shall ignore for the time

being approaches which take these relational concepts for granted and assume

that it is these grammatical relations, rather than e.g. semantic roles, which are

encoded by cases.[14]

Although not necessarily discarding the assumption entirely that object-case

assignment is (partly) contingent on the grammatical relation held by a nominal,

some approaches maintain that individual predicates, or classes of predicates, more

or less arbitrarily 'govern' particular cases. Thus, for instance the lexical entry of

the German verb helfen 'to help' would have to stipulate that its object, or, in

purely semantic terms, the participant receiving help, is in the dative, whereas

this relation or semantic role would be required to be marked with the accusative,

in basic (i.e. active) constructions, by the lexical entry of unterstützen 'to support'.

If one tries to apply this popular theory of lexical case government to a language like Old English (and many of the more synthetic Indo-European languages seem like Old English in this respect; but cp. §3.1), one quickly runs into the problem of having to cope with a great number of predicates with variable object marking. Often one gets the impression that verbs occur with different object cases, and occasionally also with prepositionally marked objects, without any recognisable, consistent principle motivating these alternations:[15]

(15) gefylgdon hine vel him (Lindisf. Gosp.) 'they followed him (Acc) or him (Dat)'[16]

(16) heo þreaþ þa unscildigan & nauht ne þreaþ þam scildigum (Ælfred, Boeth.) 'she (i.e. fate) afflicts the innocent (Acc) and does not afflict the guilty (Dat)'[17]

(17) se fæder wið-soc his bearne, and þæt bearn wið-soc þone fæder, and æt nextan ælc freond wið-soc oðres for ðam micclan egsan þe hi ðær gesawon (Ælfric, Saints' Lives) 'the father renounced his child (Dat), and the child renounced the father (Acc), and then all friends renounced each other (Gen) because of the great horror that they had seen there'

(18) a. þa ic furþum weold folce Deniga (Beow.) 'then I first ruled the people (Dat) of the Danes'

   b. ... þæt mihtig God manna cynnes weold wideferhþ (Beow.) 'that mighty God has always ruled mankind (Gen)'

   c. þe ealne middangeard geweold (Ælfric, Hom.) 'who ruled all the world (Acc)'

   d. se ofer deoflum wealdeþ (Cædmon) 'who rules (over) the devils'

(19) a. God ... mæg hælpan allum (c. 1175 Bodley Hom.) 'may God help all (Dat)'

   b. Godes mildheortnes helpð ælcne þare þe on þisse life wyle dædbote don (c. 1175 Bodley Hom.) 'God's mercy helps all (Acc) of those who in this life would be willing to show repentance'

   c. God ure helpe (Wulfstan, Hom.) 'may God help us (Gen)'[18]

Noting that a good deal of such data can be found in relatively late Old English texts, which often moreover are in northern dialects (e.g. the late Northumbrian Lindisfarne Gospels (cp. 15)), i.e. from areas where case morphology gets disorganised earlier than elsewhere, one could conclude that this seemingly arbitrary and purposeless

variation, often occurring in the same text and sometimes (cp. 15-17) even in one and the same sentence, in fact is an indication of the disintegration and eventual decay of the case system, and thus ought not be regarded as empirical evidence undermining the general validity of the lexical-government approach to case assignment.

Occasionally, e.g. in instances such as (15), this is no doubt the correct interpretation. However, it turns out that such 'uncertainties' in the use of the accusative, dative, genitive, and sometimes of prepositions are an extremely pervasive characteristic even of the earliest stages of Old English,[19] where there are no other signs of an imminent decay of the entire case system. (This is not to say ~~that there~~ that there were no changes at all in the case system in these earlier periods; the most notable change perhaps was the one affecting the 'instrumental' case.) Moreover, with a great many predicates the choice of alternative object cases, and partly prepositions, indeed is not as purposeless as could be inferred from the above examples, but instead correlates with differences in meaning, some of which are reminiscent of transitivity distinctions discussed in §2.2. A few examples must suffice to illustrate this point.

(20) a. <u>ne mæg nan mon twæm hlafordum hieran</u> (Ælfred, C.P.) 'no man can obey two lords (Dat)'; <u>þa noldan Crecas þæm bebode hieran</u> (Ælfred, Oros.) 'then the Greeks would not listen to/obey the order (Dat)'; <u>Israhelisce folc ... hyrdon Gode and Moise his þeowe</u> (Ælfric, Exodus) 'the people of Israel listened to/obeyed/followed God (Dat) and Moses his servant (Dat)'; <u>oðþæt him æghwylc þara ymbsittendra ... hyran scolde</u> (Beow.) 'until each of the neighbouring peoples would have to obey him (Dat)'; <u>Inc hyraþ eall</u> (Cædmon) 'all shall be subject/ belong to you two (Dat)'

b. <u>Ær he domdæges dyn gehyre</u> (Solomon & Saturn) 'before he'd hear doomsday's din (Acc)'; <u>þa þæt se ealdormon hierde</u> (Ælfred, Oros.) 'when the alderman heard (of) that (Acc)'; <u>Gif þu wilt gehyran þone apostol, ne swyltst þu on ecnesse</u> (Ælfric, Saints' Lives) 'if you will listen (attentively)/give ear to the apostle (Acc), you will not die in eternity'; <u>Gehyr mine stefne</u> (Blickl. Hom.) 'listen (with compliance) to/hear my voice (Acc)!' (i.e. 'accept my supplication!'); <u>Georne gehyreð heofoncyninga hyhst hæleða dæde</u> (Be Domes Dæge) 'gladly the most exalted of heavenly kings hears (judicially)/tries the deeds (Acc) of warriors'

c. se port hyrþ in on Dene (Ælfred, Oros.) 'the port belongs to/is under the authority of the Danes'; þa men ðe hiraþ into heora mynstre (Ælfric, Pastoral Epistle) 'the men who belong to their minster'; þa biscopas and þa gerefan þe to Lundenbyrig hyrað (Ancient Laws) 'the bishops and the reeves who belong to/are attached to London'

(21) a. to demenne ægðer ge ðam cucum ge ðam deadum (Ælfric, Hom.) 'to judge both the living (Dat) and the dead (Dat)'; Dryhten sylfa ... manegum demeþ (Ælfric, Exodus) 'the Lord himself ... will pass judgement on many (Dat)' (but cp. also: Dem þu þin folc (Libri Psalmorum ed. Thorpe) 'judge you your people (Acc)!')

   b. He gedemde urne Drihten to deaþe (Ælfred, Oros.) 'he condemned/sentenced our Lord (Acc) to death'; He will gedeman dæda gehwylce (Exon.) 'he will judge/consider each deed (Acc)'; Hie demaþ heora domas (Blickl. Hom.) 'they give/pass their judgements (Acc)'; God wolde hyra nydwræce deman (Guthlac) 'God would decree their exile (Acc)' (cp. also with Dat and Acc object: He eallum demeð lean æfter ryhte (Christ) 'he to all (Dat) assigns reward (Acc) rightly')

(22) a. ðæt hi georne heora bocum and gebedum fylgean (L. Eth.) 'that they strictly attend to their books (Dat) and prayers (Dat)'; him folgiað fuglas (Phoenix) 'the birds follow him (Dat)'; ðæt ælc folgie swylcum hlaforde swylcum he wille (L.Ath.) 'that each follow/serve such lord (Dat) as he will'; gif ge þissum lease leng gefylgað (Elene) 'if you pursue this falsehood (Dat) longer'; ða men ða heora lichoman lustum fyligaþ (Ælfred, Boeth.) 'those men who follow/serve their body's lusts (Dat)'; Petrus hym fyligde feorrane (Gospel St Matthew ed. Bosworth) 'Petrus followed/accompanied him (Dat) at a distance' (but cp. also: Petrus folgade hine feorran (Gosp. St Matthew Rushw.) 'Petrus followed behind him (Acc) at a distance')

   b. ond ða folgode feorhgeniþlan (Beow.) 'and then he pursued/persecuted chased his deadly foes (Acc)' (but cp. also: Guþmecga him fylgeaþ (Salomon & Saturn) 'the warrior pursues him (Dat)')

(23) a. He þearfum arede (Ælfred, Bede) 'he cared for the poor (Dat)'; ara þinum fæder & þinre medder (L. Ælfred) 'care for your father (Dat) and your mother (Dat)'; nænegum arað (Beow.) 'he spares no one (Dat)'; God wolde arian eallum ðam synfullum (Ælfric, Saints' Lives) 'God wished to pardon/forgive all the sinfull (Dat)'; he his feondum swiðe arode

(Ælfred, Bede) 'he regarded his enemies (Dat) highly'; Ara ambehtum

(Exon.) 'pity thy servants (Dat)!'

b. He araþ ða godan (Ælfred, Boeth.) 'he honours the good (Acc)' (but cp.

also: Ara þinum fæder (Ancient Laws) 'honour (or perhaps rather, 'show

respect for') your father (Dat)!'); Onsegdnis lofes gearaþ mec (AS & Early

English Psalter) 'the sacrificing of the glory honours me (Acc)'; He wæs

gearad mid freodome fram his hlaforde (Gregory's Dialogues) 'he was endowed/

presented with freedom by his lord'[21]

(24) a. He geeuenlæcð Gode (Ælfric, Hom.) 'he is like/resembles God (Dat)';

þinum Drihtne geefenlæc (Ælfric, Saints' Lives) 'act like your Lord (Dat)!';

Ðæt hi ðam flæsclicum geefenlæcon (Ælfric, Hom.) 'that they act like/

resemble (perhaps also, 'imitate') the fleshly (Dat)' (but cp. also: ... for þy

þe is geduht þæt heo þone heofonlican bogan mid hyre bleo geefenlæce

(Leechdoms) 'because it is thought that she [iris illyrica] resemble (rather

than 'imitate') the heavenly arch (Acc) with her colour')

b. Ongann Augustinus mid his munecum to geefenlæcenne ðæra apostola lif

(Ælfric, Hom.) 'Augustine with his monks began to imitate the life (Acc)

of the apostles'; Se abbod geefenlæce þa bysene þæs arfæstan hyrdes (Rule

St Benet) 'the abbot should imitate/follow/act in accordance with the

examples (Acc) of the good shepherd'; þæt þa unandgytfullan hine geefenlæcen

(Rule St Benet) 'that the unintelligent imitate him (Acc)'

(25) a. ne se bryne beot mæcgum (Daniel) 'nor did the burning hurt/smite upon the

youths (Dat)'

b. þa Balaam beot ðone assan (Deuteronomy) 'when Balaam beat the ass (Acc)';

Agynþ beatan hys efenþeowas (Gospel St Matthew) 'he begins to beat his

fellow-servants (Acc)'

(26) a. Allum ðam ðe him læstan woldon (OE Chron.) 'with all those who would

follow/accompany him (Dat)'; þæt him se lichoma læstan nolde (Beow.)

'that the body would not do him (Dat) service'; Ðæt hy him æt ðam gewinnum

gelæston (Ælfred, Oros.) 'that they would serve him (Dat) in the wars' (but

cp. also: Ðæt hine ðonne wig cume leode gelæsten (Beow.) 'that the people

serve him (Acc) when war comes'; þis sweord ... þæt mec ær ond sið oft gelæste

(Beow.) 'this sword which has accompanied/served me (Acc) well at all times';

Mec min gewit gelæsteþ (Exon.) 'my intellect attends me (Acc)'; Đonne him dagas læstun (Christ) 'while them (Dat) the days lasted' (i.e. 'in their life-time')

b. Gif he læst mina lara (Cædmon) 'if he carries out/observes my teachings (Acc)'; Ic ða wære soþe gelæste (Cædmon) 'I will truly execute the agreements (Acc)'; Gif ðu wilt his wordum hyran and his bebodu læstan (Blickl. Hom.) 'if you will listen to/obey his words and carry out his commands (Acc)'; Đæt gafol wæs gelæst (OE Chron.) 'that tribute (Nom) was paid' (cp. also with Dat and Acc objects: Gelæste he Gode his teoðunga (Ancient Laws) 'he shall pay God (Dat) his tithe (Acc)')

(27) a. Abraham wunode eðeleardum Cananea (Genesis) 'Abraham abode in the native dwellings (Dat) Cananea'; þæt he ... lete hyne ... wicum wunian oð woruld ende (Beow.) 'that he should let him live in his dwelling place (Dat) until the end of the world'

b. Siððan gast wic gewunode in ðæs weres breostum (Elene) 'since the spirit occupied/ inhabited a dwelling (Acc) in the man's breast'; seo ðe wunian sceolde cealde streamas (Beow.) 'the one who has to inhabit the cold waters (Acc)'; Đa ðe hleoleasan wic hwile wunedon (Legend St Andrew) 'those who had occupied for a while a cheerless dwelling (Acc)'; ðær he heanne beam on holt-wuda wunað (Phoenix) 'there he inhabits a lofty tree (Acc) in the wood'

c. He wunode ðær on mynstre (Ælfric, Saints' Lives) 'he lived there in the minster'; þy ilcan geare ferde to Rome ... ond þær wæs xii monaþ wuniende (OE Chron.) 'in the same year he went to Rome ... and stayed there twelve months'

¶ There are similar case alternations in two-object clauses: with a number of verbs the case marking of one object varies independently of the (case or prepositional) encoding of the other, whereas in other instances the encoding of both objects is variable, the marking of one object being dependent on that of the other. A few examples must again suffice to illustrate this;   our emphasis is on dative-accusative alternations, and no attempt has been made, therefore, to represent here the full range of object markings found in Old English two-object clauses.

(28) a. Ðæt willsume weorc ðam þeodum godspell to læranne (Ælfred, Bede) 'the pleasant work of teaching the people (Dat) the gospel (Acc)'; Fæderas ic lærde ðæt hie heora bearnum ðone þeodscipe lærdon Drihtnes egsan (Blickl. Hom.) 'I exhorted the fathers (Acc) that they should teach their children (Dat) the proper conduct (Acc) of the fear of the Lord'

b. Ne meahton we gelæran leofne þeoden ... ræd ænigne (Beow.) 'we could not persuade the dear prince (Acc) of any good counsel (Acc)'; Oðerne he lærde geðyld (Ælfred, C.P.) 'he recommended the others (Acc) patience (Acc)' (but cp. also: siþþan he his cnihtas gelæred hæfde þone cræft (Ælfred, C.P.) 'after he had taught his pupils (Acc) the craft (Acc)')

(29) a. Absalon ... wolde his agenum fæder feores benæman (Ælfric, Saints' Lives) 'Absalom wanted to deprive his own father (Dat) of his life (Gen)'

b. Sceolde hine yldo beniman ellendæda dreames and drihtscipes (Genesis) 'age must deprive him (Acc) of the joy (Gen) of bold deeds and of ruler- ship (Gen)'

c. ... and him his feorh benam (Ælfric, Saints' Lives) 'and took away from him (Dat) his life (Acc)'

d. he sceolde Edwine ðone cyning ... ge rice ge lif beniman (Ælfred, Bede) 'he had to deprive king Edwin (Acc) both of his kingdom (Acc) and his life (Acc)'

(30) a. Gehreafadon hine ðæs fellereades (Lindisf. Gosp.) 'they robbed him (Acc) of the purple robe (Gen)'; Gif hwylc man reafige oðerne æt his dehter (L. Ecg. P.) 'if one man robs another (Acc) of his daughter'

b. Secgaþ ðæt his ðegnas gereafodan his lic on us and forstælan (Blickl. Hom.) 'say that his disciples seized his body (Acc) from us and stole it away'

(31) a. Wisdom lænende vel tiðiende litlingum (Lamb. Ps.) 'lending or granting the little ones (Dat) wisdom (Acc)'; se him fultum tiþaþ (Bosworth & Toller p. 989) 'who grant them (Dat) help (Acc)'

b. Hy him ðære bene getigðedon (Ælfred, Oros.) 'they granted him (Dat) the request (Gen)'

c. ne hine mon on oþre wisan his bene tyþigean wolde (Ælfred, Bede) 'one did not want to grant him (Acc) his request (Gen) otherwise' [22]

(32) a. Hio ða gifede mycele þinc ðam biscope (Legends of the Holy Rood) 'she then gave great gifts (Acc) to the bishop (Dat)' (cp. also: <u>Se cyng him wel gegifod hæfde on golde and on seolfre</u> (OE Chron.) 'the king had bestowed on/given to him (Dat) many gifts (plentifully) of gold and silver')

b. He mæg me geofian mid goda gehwilcum (Cædmon) 'he can endow me (Acc)[23] with every good'; <u>Ic hine mid deorweorðum gyfum gegeafede</u> (Narratiunculæ Anglice conscriptæ) 'I enriched/honoured him (Acc) with precious gifts'

(33) a. <u>Ða het he hine wurpan deorum</u> (Ælfric, Saints' Lives) 'then he commanded to throw him (Acc) to the wild animals (Dat)'; <u>Weorpaþ hit hundum</u> (Ælfric, Exodus) 'he throws it (Acc) to the dogs (Dat)'; <u>hi wurpon hine on ðone bat</u> (OE Chron.) 'they threw him (Acc) on the boat'; <u>Se deofol wearp ænne stan to ðære bellan</u> (Ælfric, Hom.) 'the devil threw a stone (Acc) at the bell'

b. he hine eft ongon wæteres weorpan (Beow.) 'he then began to sprinkle him (Acc) with water (Gen)';[24] <u>Gif men cidaþ and hira oðer hys nextan mid stane wirpð oððe mid fyste slicð</u> (Ælfric, Exodus) 'if men quarrel and one of them throws a stone (Prep) at the other (Acc) (perhaps rather: hits the other with a stone) or hits him with his fist'; <u>Seo clænnys wyrpð ða galnysse mid stane</u> (Glosses Prudentius) 'purity hits wantonness (Acc) with a stone';[25] <u>Stephanus wæs stanum worpod</u> (Elene) 'Stephanus was pelted with stones (Dat/Instr)' (i.e. he was stoned to death)

c. <u>Streamas weorpaþ on stealchleoþa stane and sonde</u> (Exon.) 'the rivers throw stone and sand (Dat/Instr) upon the steep slope'

¶ These were ■■■■■■ fairly characteristic examples of the patterns of object encoding ■■■■ found in Old English. No effort has been made here to present a stylistically, geographically, or historically homogeneous data sample; even if the amount of variability of object markings observed with individual verbs may to a certain extent be due to the variety of texts considered, there is still enough evidence to suggest beyond reasonable doubt that this kind of patterning is not an artifact created by the way these data have been selected.

Now, the semantic and perhaps pragmatic factors favouring one object case over the others ~~and~~ ·or· over certain prepositions may sometimes be difficult to discern at first sight—a difficulty which is occasionally aggravated by our strategy of quoting individual sentences, or only parts of them, without the wider contexts in which they occur . What strikes one, nevertheless, is that very frequently different predicates have to be employed in Modern English translations to bring out the semantic-pragmatic differences expressed by alternative case (or preposition) choices in Old English. Those wishing to stick to the position of lexical case-government might take this as a clue to what really determines these patterns of variable object marking. On the basis of one-to-many lexical correspondences between Old and Modern English, they might conclude that there is simply a great deal of homonymy in the Old English verbal lexicon. That is, they might assume that there is not just one but at least two or three verbs hieran, the one meaning 'to hear (of)', and perhaps also 'to give ear/ listen attentively to' and 'to hear judicially/try' (unless these are considered meanings of two further homonymous verbs), and governing the accusative, the other meaning 'to listen assentingly to/obey/follow/serve/be subject to' and governing the dative, and perhaps yet another one meaning 'to belong to/be attached to/be under the dominion of' and usually requiring to, in, or related prepositions or also the dative as object markers — and so forth for all verbs with alternative object marking.

But this conclusion *is* fundamentally mistaken (cp. Penhallurick 1975: 11). Not only are the members of the innumerable 'homonymous' verb pairs always semantically related (which is characteristically not the case with true homonyms), but the differences in verbal meaning corresponding to the different object encodings also seem to involve one or more common denominators, rather than varying arbitrarily from one verb to the next. This suggests that it is more appropriate to conclude that Old English verbs like hieran, folgian, heran, beniman etc. characteristically manifest a certain pattern of polysemy, or — and this may amount to the same thing — have relatively unspecific lexical meanings, these core meanings being what is invariant throughout all their occurrences, and that it is the alternative object encodings themselves which are responsible for rendering the verb meanings more specific. Thus, object cases or prepositions would be assigned in accordance with their own meanings rather than being essentially meaningless markers arbitrarily governed by individual lexical entries, or arbitrarily associated with particular grammatical object relations. In the preceding sections we have already dealt with potential candidates for case meanings, viz. participant roles and transitivity, and these are certainly not entirely irrelevant for the distribution of object markers in a language like Old English. However, yet there are further candidates, which in fact have occasionally figured in general theories of case systems. (I will return presently to a closer analysis of the kind of data exemplified above.)

2.4. Jacob Grimm's comparative Germanic grammar (vol. 4, 1837) is as good a place as any to begin to come to terms with what suitable object-case meanings would have to be like. Of course there are innumerable case theories, localist, non-localist, and mixed, and some of them may be more elaborate or original than Jacob Grimm's. But his account very well illustrates the point which is most important here : viz. the systemic and relative, rather than atomistic and absolute, nature of those case meanings which are associated with core, i.e. predicate-governed, argument relations — a point that tends to be overlooked in case theories which posit extremely general meaning categories such as 'relation' (e.g. Winkler 1887, 1896, "beziehung") or 'direction' (e.g. Wüllner 1827) for the accusative and 'participation/interest' (Winkler, "beteiligung/interesse") or 'location' (Wüllner) for the dative. According

to Grimm, the accusative, genitive, and dative must be seen as essentially
partitioning a single semantic dimension, 'objectiveness', with the accusative
occupying the extreme, most objective position of this dimension and the genitive
being still closer to this end than the least objective dative ("der gen. ist mehr
objectiv als der dat., minder als der acc.", 1837:682), and with the individual
case meanings (most/less/least objective) being definable only in contrast to
one another, rather than absolutely. ▆▆▆ Grimm's notion of objectiveness is
in some respects reminiscent of semantic transitivity, in particular of the factor
'thorough affectedness/effectedness', but the way he characterises this notion
suggests that its semantic basis is at least more complex than a mere differentiation
of a participant's degree of involvement. Also relevant is the kind of involvement:
clauses with an accusative object represent what Grimm describes as "ruhig erfolgende
einwirkung auf ein object" (1837:620), "reine, sichere wirkungen" (1837:646),
"vollste, entschiedenste bewältigung eines gegenstandes durch den im verbo des
satzsubjects enthaltnen begrif" (1837:646), whereas the use of the genitive
indicates "gehemmte, modificierte wirkungen", "die thätige kraft wird dabei
gleichsam nur versucht und angehoben, nicht erschöpft" (1837:646), and in
clauses with dative objects the "einwirkung auf das object" is not represented
as "ruhig" but as "persönlicher und lebhafter" (1837:620). Grimm repeatedly
emphasises the importance of the person/thing distinction for the choice of the
most appropriate object case, but unlike Hopper & Thompson (1980) does not
assume that persons are the prototypical referents of the most objective, or most
transitive, objects — on the contrary:

> alle solche gegenstände der abhängigkeit mögen sowol personen
> als sachen sein, doch mit merklichem übergewicht der letzteren;
> ja es liesse sich annehmen, dass die einwirkung des verbums auf
> die person sie zur sache mache. hebt sich der persönliche begrif,
> so ist die structur geneigt, aus der rein accusativischen in eine
> gemischte, oder in die eines andern casus überzutreten. ... Verba,
> deren einwirkung hauptsächlich auf personen gerichtet ist, die
> begriffe von hilfe, dienst, ehre, anbetung, folge, lehre, segen
> enthaltend, regieren einen weniger objectiven acc., welcher
> darum in den dat. und gen. überschwankt. (1837:610,614)[26]

In view of the way Grimm characterises the different modes of 'acting on the
object', viz. as more or less 'smoothly' and 'thoroughly, firmly accomplishing',

is
it ~~means~~ indeed understandable that persons, which are inherently active rather
than inert and thus themselves potentially "einwirkend", acting on others, should
not be paradigm instances of highly objective objects.

imply
However, I do not wish to ~~implicate~~ that Jacob Grimm's account of object-case
meanings in Germanic constitutes an empirically adequate and conceptually entirely
satisfactory theory. To mention only one of its empirical deficiencies, it fails to ex-
plain a quite common use of the genitive in languages like Old English, where ~~it~~
arguably
~~could be argued that~~ the genitive is not employed with the intention of differentiating
a less objective from a fully objective relation, but rather in order to differentiate
causative (or source or stimulus) from prototypically agentive relations (cp. verbs with
genitive actants such as gelystan 'desire', sc(e)amian 'be ashamed', ofþyncan 'be
displeased', brucan 'enjoy', fægnian 'rejoice', þurfan 'need', hlystan 'hear', etc.).[27]
And one could also be inclined to criticise Grimm for the vagueness and apparent
indeterminacy of his characterisation of the meanings of the dative and the genitive
in general. However, this 'vagueness' and 'indeterminacy' may, on the contrary, be
a major strength of Grimm's theory. Notice that Grimm (1837:682) himself in fact
recognises that the semantic relation held by a genitive—and one should add: dative—
object is "vielfach deutbar". Given the lexical meaning of a predicate and of the
arguments in semantic core relations, the object cases forming a semantic system
together with the accusative have to do no more than signal that the speaker has
reason to believe that the argument in question is not in a most objective relation.
Grimm's claim is, in other words, that the dative and the genitive only have meaning
by virtue of being part of a semantic system with the accusative/most-objective case
as the point of reference for the determination of further, negative (not most-objective)
values. (Grimm does not really argue the point that 'most objective' rather than 'least
objective/unobjective' is the unmarked value; but this decision seems nevertheless
quite reasonable in his own terms: presupposing an opposition of the grammatical
relations of subject and object-in-general, the unmarked instance of an object ought
not be one whose properties concerning its potential mode of participation are rather
like those of prototypical subjects.) This manner of acquiring a value only relative
to the potential alternative terms of the system may then, under certain circum-
stances, result in variability in the employment of the object cases available. In

the absence of clear-cut, preconceived boundaries between the domains where
the alternative cases are most appropriate, it would be rather surprising if there
were no situations where it does not make much difference whether one case is
used or another (cp. Grimm 1837: 682: "wenn also meistentheils der gebrauch des
einen oder des andern casus keine grosse abweichung der begriffe nach sich zieht,
kann diese doch manchmal stark hervortreten"). Vacillation in the choice of object
cases as illustrated in the Old English examples (15)-(19), thus, would not
necessarily have to be taken for a sign of the disintegration of the case system,
if it could be shown that this happens precisely in predicate-argument con-
figurations where neither case marker is semantically entirely inappropriate.
In such situations the speaker might be free to express with the help of the
semantically almost neutralised case opposition his personal view of the state
of affairs (cp. again Grimm 1837: 620: "was hilft mich das? ['What does that
help me (acc)?'] ist objectiver geredet, was hilft mir [dat] das? persönlicher").[28]

To conclude this brief outline of Jacob Grimm's account of object-case
meanings in Germanic, it should be mentioned that it ~~~~~~~~~~~~ bears com-
parison, in logical structure, with some later case theories such as those of
Jakobson (1936, 1958), Diver (1964), and García (1975, ch. 4), which likewise
do not provide autonomous meanings for individual cases independently of one
another, but instead hold that (at least certain) cases are meaningful only as
members of syntagmatic and paradigmatic oppositions in particular semantic
dimensions. Thus, Jakobson posits (for Russian) three meaning correlations — víz.,
"Bezug", "Umfang", "Stellung" —, each specifying a property signalled by the
marked member of a case opposition, but not signalled by its unmarked member,
so that the basic meanings (or, rather, "Gesamtbedeutungen") of the individual
cases are only determinable with reference to this entire system of markedness
correlations. According to Diver, the meaning contribution of the 'grammatical' cases
(in Latin) is contingent on the number of actants co-occurring in a clause; in clauses
with two or three actants there are only one (nominative) or two (nominative and
accusative) cases with some definite, positive meaning defined in terms of semantic
roles ('agent' and 'patient'), whereas the case of the remaining actant (accusative
or dative in one-object clauses,[29] dative in two-object clauses) is without any positive
meaning, signalling merely that the respective actant is not an agent (one-object

clauses) or neither an agent nor a patient (two-object clauses). García, emphasising
like Diver the importance of syntagmatic oppositions, suggests (for Spanish) 'degree
of activeness of participation' as/relevant semantic dimension, with co-occurring
actants being differentiable as most or less or least active participants relative to
one another.[30]

2.5. What follows is another attempt to characterise, in outline, the semantic dimension
underlying the differentiation of objects commonly encoded by markers corresponding to the
accusative and dative case in languages like Old English, i.e. the dimension which
Grimm accounts for in terms of objectiveness, Jakobson in terms of a "Stellungskorrelation"
(nonperipheral vs. peripheral participation in the message), Diver in terms of positive
vs. merely negative semantic-role specifications ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓, and García in terms
of least vs. less active participation in the event. To simplify matters, the genitive
in particular will be ignored in the present attempt; although ▓▓▓▓▓ a good case
could in fact be made for not including this case in one semantic system together with
the dative and the accusative at least as far as Old English is concerned, I refrain from
actually arguing this point here.[31]

The important point, to begin with, is that it is not enough to consider only
the relationships holding between predicates and individual object arguments. Even
though it may be possible to distinguish objects in predicate-related roles such as
patient, stimulus, recipient etc., or, less abstractly, victim (of a killing), product
(resulting from a creative activity), receiver of help/of an answer etc., it seems
more important, for the morphosyntax of certain languages at least, to distinguish
in more general terms the relationships holding between all arguments, in particular
those in non-circumstantial roles, co-occurring with a predicate. That is, rather
than focussing attention exclusively on/individual role relations governed by predicates (on parts of
their 'case frames', to employ familiar terminology), we ought to look more closely
at the relationships between entire argument configurations.

On a fairly general semantic level the relationships between the various
arguments of a predicate, and also those between the argument sets of different predicates,
can then be differentiated as to the degree of the arguments'/opposedness with respect to the
relation denoted by the predicate. The participants in a situation may, I suggest, be

-31-

represented as more or less opposed to one another, depending to a considerable extent
on the way the situation is identified by the predicate. The arguments of many two-place

(insertion above: relational structure of the)

verbs of activity, as ~~found~~ found in Standard Average European and no doubt other

(non-ergative) languages, ~~~~ almost by necessity ~~~~ refer to participants ~~~~

~~~~ diametrically opposed to one another: one referent is most actively involved, the

other least actively; the latter is most thoroughly effected/affected by what is happening

to him/it, and is thus seen as being completely under the control and influence of the

(insertion: (but nevertheless as dependent upon))

former; and the two antagonists are thus represented as maximally unlike/each other

with regard to their involvement in the situation identified by the predicate. Predicates

denoting activities of creation (someone causes someone/something to come into existence),

of manipulation and modification (someone causes someone/something to change his/her/its

state or position),and of annihilation (someone causes someone/something to cease to

(insertion: are)

exist) accordingly ~~~~ the prototypical instances of relationships

of polar opposedness. To adduce a few more concrete examples, the activities of

someone building a house, singing a song, writing a letter (all creations), stealing

horses, serving coffee, chasing rabbits, eating haggis (all manipulations/modifications),

killing an enemy, destroying a building (all annihilations), would have as their common

denominator that the participants involved may be represented as polar opposites. (In

particular if the least active participant is not (yet) affected/effected entirely, they

need not necessarily be represented in this manner, though.) The successful per-

formance of such activities as digesting or chewing haggis, on the other hand, may

already involve the food in a slightly less uninfluential, less passive or inert

capacity, at least in comparison with the kind of activity denoted by a predicate

(insertion: is)

meaning 'to eat': it ~~seems~~ easier to attribute at least partial responsibility for the

proper execution to the food if a situation is identified as chewing or digesting rather

than as eating. In general, in activities with two participants which are seen as

less than diametrically opposed, there again is a most active participant, but its

opposite number is more appropriately characterised as less active vis-à-vis the

least active participant of polar opposites, as less completely under the influence

and control of the agent, and as more similar to the agent with regard to their in-

volvement. Answering, obeying, following/accompanying (as opposed to pursuing

or persecuting), helping, thanking, meeting (with)/coming across, avoiding or

giving way to someone are ~~~~ typical examples of activities where one would

not usually think of the participants as polarly opposed to one another. But it must always be borne in mind that polar and non-polar opposedness are no absolute values: the one can only be defined with reference to the other. Moreover, opposedness is basically a matter of degrees, and although there may be

certain kinds of relationships which would normally be regarded as relatively clear cases of polar or of non-polar opposedness, the opposedness status of others may a priori be rather indeterminate, allowing of either interpretation without any noticeable semantic difference. One might consider designating one of the opposedness extremes (presumably polar opposedness, on account of the maximally un-subjectlike nature of objects in such relationships; see § 2.4) as the unmarked case for two-place predicates in general, any appreciable deviation from this standard then constituting a marked case requiring some special morphosyntactic treatment (such as the employment of special object encoding). But this general strategy would seem to ignore the fact that there are equally clear cases of relationships both of polar and of non-polar opposedness, with the two extremes presupposing each other and neither being conceptually more basic, thus suggesting that polar vs. non-polar opposedness is ░░░░░░░░░░░ an equipollent rather than privative opposition.

We have so far concentrated on paradigmatic differentiation: 'more (polar or diametrical) opposed' as distinguished from 'less opposed' on the basis of a comparison of different two-participant role configurations. In the case of syntagmatic differentiation relationships between arguments are distinguished according to the same semantic parameter, only the polar and non-polar opposedness relationships occur in one and the same clause, i.e. with predicates identifying situations as involving more than two (non-circumstantial) participant roles. For example, in describing activities such as giving someone a present (giving being perhaps the prototypical instance of an argument configuration requiring this kind of syntagmatic differentiation[32]), sending someone a letter, telling someone a story, stealing someone a horse, the speaker is likely to make a choice as to which of the two object roles present is to be rendered as the polar opposite (as least active, most completely under control/influence, as most dissimilar in its manner of involvement) of the most active participant. And although in most situations ░░░░░░░░░
seems unlikely to
░░░ this polar opposite ░░░░░░ be the person, institution, or being involved as recipient, addressee, beneficiary, or victim, this is by no means a foregone conclusion: in principle, either choice ░░_is_░░░░░ possible in such cases, given the appropriate circumstances (e.g. if an addressee is literally flooded with

letters, he rather than the letters could appropriately be represented as polarly opposed to the sender). Now, given this variability, it could seem ~~to be no longer~~ *im-* possible to determine from the encoding of co-occurring objects as polar and non-polar opposites their concrete participant roles. If I know, for example, that with a predicate meaning something like 'send/flood' one object (say, 'The White House') refers to the polar opposite and the other object (say, 'letters') to the non-polar opposite, this information alone will not enable me to infer unambiguously which object denotes the receiver and which object the entity travelling from sender to receiver, since both roles, receiver and entity travelling, could in principle be given the status of polar and of non-polar opposite. However, the lexical meaning of the object nominals concerned will as a rule prevent relational misinterpretations (e.g. knowing what the nominals 'The White House' and 'letters' refer to, one would hardly be tempted to infer that The White House is being sent, the letters being the receiver), so that additional relational-semantic encoding (as with Modern English verbs like present: present something to someone/someone with something) *is* ~~would commonly be~~ rather redundant. Not all role ambiguities may be resolved lexically, however, if relational encoding is determined by syntagmatic opposedness differentiation. Particularly with certain kinds of predicates quite different
are
participant roles ~~might be~~ equally good candidates for the status of non-polar opposite (e.g. the roles of victim, beneficiary, and perhaps instigator or interested party with predicates such as 'steal'), and disambiguation may then be possible only with the help of contextual information.[33]

It should in principle be possible for two (non-circumstantial) objects in a two--object clause to be seen as equally opposed to another role (that of agent/subject), at least in certain kinds of configurations (teaching and asking someone something
is
are ~~perhaps~~ typical examples), although this ~~seems to be~~ an exception rather than the rule if a language does in fact differentiate morphosyntactically objects as more
(cf. Plank 1986)
or less opposed to begin with. If two object roles are assigned the same opposedness
∧
status rather than being syntagmatically differentiated as more and less opposed, which particular common status, more (polar) or less (non-polar) opposed, are they to have? It seems that neither of the two options can be excluded as a matter of principle. Whereas two polar opposite objects may co-occur with predicates like 'to teach' or 'to ask', predicates like 'to answer/obey/help/thank' etc., which

tend to be treated as identifying relationships of non-polar opposedness between two
predicate-governed roles, may allow a further, not strictly predicate-governed role,
that of interested party, which is likewise in non-polar opposition. Our conceptual
framework is thus less restrictive than ~~that of~~ García's (1975:99ff.),
who holds that there is one absolute value, 'least active', realised not more than
once in a single clause, whereas several roles present in a clause may simultaneously
acquire the relative value, 'less active'. Given the semantic nature of the most
common predicates co-occurring with two (or more) objects in non-circumstantial
roles, it may indeed be the statistical norm that there is one polar opposite object
in such clauses, the extreme opposedness value   of which serves as a standard
for the syntagmatic differentiation of one or more less than polarly opposed objects,
'polar opposedness' in this sense being the point of departure (the unmarked case) of
procedures of syntagmatic differentiation. ~~It would nevertheless remain the case~~ *Nevertheless,*
~~that~~ what is being differentiated are primarily degrees of opposedness, syntagmatically
as well as paradigmatically, and the comparison of opposedness values does not pre-
suppose reference to a preconceived extreme value (polar) as an absolute standard.
If it should turn out ~~to be~~ necessary to compare the opposedness relationships of more
than two objects in a single clause (although predicates with four or more non-
-circumstantial roles are rare[34]),   three-way differentiations
are also   possible in this framework: roles a (subject) and b are more opposed
to each other than roles a and c, which in turn are more opposed to each other than
roles a and d. This possibility should not to be excluded on theoretical grounds,
although it is perhaps reasonable to expect that a more economical solution is pre-
ferable   in such rare instances, with overt morphosyntactic differentiation of
not more than two opposedness statuses, granting the possibility of more than one
role simultaneously acquiring the same status.

We have so far illustrated the principle of paradigmatically and syntagmatically
differentiated degrees of opposedness with predicates denoting activities; but this
principle clearly applies to other predicates as well, including those whose lexical
meaning is unspecific enough for them to denote both activities and, say, experiences.
For instance, if someone hears or sees something, these *are* ~~illustrate~~ typical
relationships of polar opposedness between perceiver and stimulus, whereas other

experiencer-stimulus configurations, such as to be pleased with/like someone or some-
thing, to remember something, to be in need of something etc., are ▓▓▓▓▓ more
liable to be regarded as non-polar opposites. The categorial distinction between
verbal and adjectival/nominal predicates has already been mentioned in the section
on clausal transitivity (§2.2), but ▓▓▓▓▓▓ the suggestions made there are
equally valid in the present conceptual framework. If a relationship between two
participant roles is to be represented as one of polar opposedness, adjectival or
nominal predicates, on account of their categorial semantics, are normally less
appropriate for this purpose than truly verbal predicates.

It needs to be emphasised that the morphosyntactic differentiation of degrees
of opposedness is a genuinely linguistic matter, although it no doubt has cognitive
and, ultimately, perceptual correlates. Thus, the assumption is plausible
that humans can classify interactions they perceive or represent cognitively according
to the opposedness relationships holding between the entities interacting. But it
would be wrong   to conclude that this cognitive or/capacity ^perceptual must therefore be
reflected   universally in the morphosyntax of object relations. Of crucial
importance in this regard is the lexical meaning of predicates found in individual
languages: predicate expressions identify the interactions perceived and cognised,
and they may identify   differently what to all intents and purposes are instances
of one and the same interaction. That is, whether or not object relations are morpho-
syntactically differentiated in terms of their opposedness values is to a considerable
extent determined by the way particular predicate expressions conceptualise
relationships in interactions among sets of participants.   Activities of creation
and annihilation were referred to/for ^above the purpose of illustrating prototypical relation-
ships of polar opposedness; but they do illustrate polar opposedness only by virtue of
being expressed with the help of predicates resembling in certain respects English
two-place verbs such as to create/make/build   and to annihilate/destroy/kill
(although this is not to say that Modern English therefore necessarily distinguishes,
morphosyntactically, objects of different degrees of opposedness). Situations where
something/someone is being created or annihilated may, however, equally well be
identified without predicates denoting quite specific role relationships, with the

participants in the two (or more) predicate-governed roles then being differentiable

as more or less opposed to each other. Predicates identifying creations or annihilations

may, for instance, not incorporate a causative component, and thus require that

the kind of involvement of a causal or agentive participant be specified outside the

predicate. Predicate expressions are again available in English to illustrate this:

'someone died at an agent's hands/from a wound/of illness or another cause/in an

accident', 'an artifact (e.g. a house) came into existence/arose/originated from/

due to (the work of) an agent'. Insofar as predicates conceptualised approximately

in this manner do not themselves denote relationships between creator/annihilator

(agent/cause) and entity created/annihilated (effected/affected patient), but instead

only attribute certain changes of state to the participant not causally or agentively

involved (which would therefore seem to be the unmarked focus of attention), degrees

of opposedness cannot be differentiated with respect to a relationship denoted by

the predicate — the predicate simply denotes none. There are still further possibilities

for predicates to be conceptualised non-relationally. Instead of predicates denoting

simultaneously the different kinds of involvement of two interacting entities (e.g.

relationships between agent and patient or goal as in 'A killed/murdered B' or 'A

approached/reached B'), we may find predicates encoding such situations as involving

only a single participant role, requiring further kinds of participation to be specified

independently of the predicate itself. To paraphrase this manner of representing

interactions in English: 'A acted-as-a-murderer/murderously, towards/affecting/with respect to B',

'A moved towards B'. Or predicates may be entirely self-sufficient, incorporating

no reference to any kind of involvement at all: 'there-was-killing-going-on/occurred-

death, involving agent A and patient B', 'there-was-movement, of A towards B'.[35]

If predicate meanings are inherently non-relational with regard to

certain participant roles, i.e. if certain kinds of participation have to be identified

independently of the predicate, then the respective roles are not usually represented

as entering opposedness relationships (which could then be morphosyntactically dif-

ferentiated); their relational encoding in particular is determined quite autonomously

by their own kind of involvement[36] and independently of the roles they interact with.

Role configurations may be differentiated according to their degree of opposedness,

on the other hand, if the semantic nature of the relationship between the respective

participants is fully encoded by the predicate, i.e. if the predicate meaning is

inherently relational, genuinely implying the presence of these participant roles.
This brings us back to the concept of closeness of association between verbs and
certain objects discussed edrlier, if somewhat inconclusively (see § 2.1). Without
relating this concept immediately to any notion of 'direct object', it ~~~~~~~~~
can be given a reasonable interpretation in ~~~ light of these suggestions about
relational or non-relational predicate conceptualisations: (non-subject) participant
roles are closely associated with the predicate to the extent that their way of in-
volvement in the situation is encoded by the predicate itself, rather than independently.
~~~~~~~~ This interpretation does not yet constitute an explanation of any regular
patternings eventually to be observed in this area. (Why is it, for instance, that
certain roles rather than others tend to be incorporated in relationships denoted
by predicates? Why should predicates be relational at all, at least in some languages?)
But it should have clarified what needs to be explained in the first place: the relational
or non-relational conceptualisations of predicates. Although no fully satisfactory
explanation can be offered here, one might plausibly speculate
about certain regularities possibly underlying eventual patternings of predicate
conceptualisation. I suggest that predicates, if conceptualised relationally at all,
are most likely to be inherently relational with respect to participant roles which
satisfy the following criteria: (a) the referents in these roles typically ought to be
[most likely to occur]
highly individuated;[37] (b) they typically ought to be pragmatically salient, particularly
in the sense of being likely to figure centrally in the commentative part of
utterances; and (c) they typically ought to be in the sphere of influence and control
of individuals (especially of the prototypical actor and experiencer, the ego) inter-
acting physically, mentally and emotionally with their environment, the most characteristic
kinds of interaction perhaps being acts of creation, manipulation/modification (in-
cluding perceptual and experiential grasping), and annihilation.[38] Indirect
empirical justification of this particular set of criteria may be derived from a
cross-linguistic survey of objects capable of being incorporated in predicates
(thus clearly rendering the complex predicate expression as a whole non-relational
with respect to the incorporated role) and of clear cases of circumstantial-role
objects, which would seem to indicate that these kinds of objects characteristically,
if in different ways, do not partake of the criterial properties just mentioned.

Recall also that in discussing semantic transitivity (§ 2.2) no reference was made to the notion of transitive/intransitive verbs as such. Rather than resting content with a derivative definition of this notion as 'verb occurring in a clause of high/low semantic transitivity', where the verb itself is only one of the various factors contributing to the overall clausal degree of transitivity, I suggest that predicate classes corresponding to the traditional notions of transitives and in-transitives have to be defined independently, on the basis of the inherently relational or non-relational nature of predicate meanings. To avoid confusion, I propose to employ the terms 'autonomous' (intransitive) and 'incomplete' (uni-/bi- and perhaps tri-transitive) for this purpose: a predicate is incomplete if conceptualised as denoting a relationship between two or more participant roles, and autonomous (i.e. non-relational) otherwise.[39] From what has been said above, it ought to be clear that languages may well differ as to whether they exhibit incomplete predicates in addition to autonomous ones, whereas clauses ~~~~~~ are universally differentiable, if with differing morphosyntactic manifestations, as to their degree of semantic transitivity. Insightful accounts of the large-scale development of incomplete verbs in the history of Indo-European languages, where originally only autonomous predicates existed, may be found, for instance, in Bréal (1897, ch. 20), Meillet (1937:358f.), and Blinkenberg (1960, ch. 1); and one might speculate that this, rather than the reverse, is indeed the likelier kind of develop-ment in general, although it is no doubt possible, if perhaps usually on a smaller scale, for incomplete predicates to be diachronically re-conceptualised as autonomous.[40]

Let us now return to the Old English data adduced in § 2.3 to demonstrate the inappropriateness of the concept of lexical object-case government. The conceptual framework outlined in the present section, centred on the semantic notion of opposedness relationships between participant roles, suggests a less arbitrary, hence superior analysis of the dative-accusative opposition in Old English. In a nutshell, the accusative encodes, perhaps among other things, objects differentiated as more (polarly) opposed to another participant role (usually construed as subject), and the dative/objects encodes less (non-polarly) opposed. But it has to be noted first that many Old English verbs may occur with case-marked participant roles without really denoting

relationships genuinely involving these roles. This is the case in particular with genitive and dative/instrumental objects, but applies also to certain objects en- coded by the (non-instrumental) dative and accusative. Predicates accompanied by such roles may have to be conceptualised as semantically autonomous, as not inherently relational, and the respective cases, therefore, may have to be assigned , as is usual for circumstantial roles, independently of the role structure embodied in the predicate meaning. Visser (1970:355) rightly points out the danger of ignoring such differences in predicate conceptualisation in translations. Modern English translations of examples such as <u>he gebad deaþes</u> 'he expected/awaited (the coming of) death (Gen)', <u>ic æfestige his godra</u> 'I envy (him) his good works (Gen)' tend to gloss over these differences, which may be brought out more clearly by paraphrasing the predicates non-relationally, thereby separating the role relation- ship held by the object from the predicate meaning: 'he was in expectation/expectant, with regard to/on account of the coming of death', 'I am envious, with respect to/ because of his good works'. Nevertheless, as to the verbs with dative-accusative object alternations that interest us here, they may with some justification be con- sidered incomplete rather than autonomous. Even if we follow again Visser (1970: 280) in translating verbs allowing dative objects such as <u>þancan, forgiefan, helpan</u> as 'give thanks', 'offer forgivenness', 'give help' rather than with the corresponding simple Modern English verbs 'thank', 'forgive', 'help', such predicate conceptions are still inherently incomplete, implying relationships between actor and recipient roles.

Bearing in mind how the paradigmatic differentiation of degrees of opposedness has been characterised and illustrated above, it is difficult not to recognise a common pattern in the choice of the accusative or the dative in Old English one-object clauses such as (20)-(27) and to go on maintaining that the distribution of these inherently meaningless case markers is semantically entirely arbitrary. There is a relatively uniform difference in meaning between the accusative-object and the dative-object clauses, signalled above all by the object-case markers themselves rather than by the verb forms, which obviously attests to their meaningfulness: [41]

    (20) In relationships (conceptualised as ones) of hearing(-of), listening-
                                    and
        attentively, hearing-and-accepting-what-is-heard/ hearing-judicially/

trying, the participant roles involved tend to be more opposed to
each other than in relationships of obeying/following, being-subject-
to or of belonging-to. (Belonging-to in the sense of possession and
ownership may in principle be represented as a relationship between
polar opposites; but if the possession is construed as subject and the
possessor as object, the inert participant under the control/influence
of its opponent is not in the object relation to begin with.)

(21) In relationships of condemning/sentencing, considering and decreeing,
the participant roles involved tend to be more opposed to each other
than in relationships of judging/passing-judgement-on especially between
people. Although the latter relationships may occasionally be con-
ceptualised as ones of polar opposedness, the former do not lend them-
selves to a non-polar interpretation.

(22) In relationships of pursuing/persecuting/chasing, the participant roles
involved tend to be more opposed to each other ~~[illegible]~~ than in
relationships of attending-to, following/accompanying, serving.

(23) In relationships of honouring and endowing, the participant roles involved
tend to be more opposed to each other than in relationships of caring-for, being-kind-
-towards,
(sparing, pardoning/forgiving, pitying, regarding-highly/showing-respect.

(24) In relationships of intentionally imitating and reproducing (a pattern of
behaviour), the participant roles involved tend to be more opposed to
each other than in relationships of being-like/resembling, acting-like
($\neq$ re-enact) — although the conceptual distinctions here are sometimes
quite tenuous.

(25) In relationships of beating (with an animate agent), the participant roles
involved tend to be more opposed to each other than in relationships of
hurting (with animate patient, but inanimate source of pain).

(26) In relationships of carrying-out/executing and paying (something), the
participant roles involved tend to be more opposed to each other than
in relationships of following/accompanying, doing-service. Whereas
the latter relationships may lend themselves to a polar-opposedness
interpretation, the former never come close to being taken for instances
of non-polar opposedness.

and controlling

(27) In relationships of fully occupying/inhabiting/ the participant roles in-
    volved tend to be more opposed to each other than in purely spatial
    relationships of living-in/abiding-in/staying-in.

It is perhaps not entirely coincidental that object-case variation apparently lacking
any such semantic rationale, as with the verbs illustrated in (15)-(19), tends to be
found with predicate-governed relationships which are not particularly clear cases
of either polar or non-polar opposedness. The semantic nature of the relationships, i.e.
the predicate meaning, does not vary a whole lot in these instances whether the
interaction is regarded as involving more or less opposed participants. Other kinds
of predicates, as those in (20)-(27), refer to kinds of interaction where opposedness
differentiations mostly do make a semantic difference. What needs to be emphasised,
                                                latter
however, is that these/predicates themselves, on account of their lexical meaning,
do not absolutely require the relationships among the participant roles implied by
them to be either of the more (polarly) or less (non-polarly) opposed type. Their
lexical meaning is such as to be compatible with either possibility, the decision
between the alternatives then resting entirely with the marking of the objects.
What do such predicates mean, then? Their meanings obviously must be conceptualised
so broadly as to encompass all the relationships differing in degree of opposedness
which I have tried to render in Modern English above (in the case of hieran, for
instance: 'hear(-of)', 'listen-attentively', 'hear-and-accept (what is heard)',
'hear-judicially/try' as well as 'obey/follow', 'be-subject-to', 'belong-to').
Granting this, the question need not be mooted here whether such verbs are truly
                                                              lexical
polysemous or whether they are monosemous, their single/meaning being
relatively abstract and unspecific, requiring contextual information (provided by
the encoding of their objects) to be restricted to identifying more specifically
particular interactions. At any rate, this issue does not affect what is being suggested
here as the meaning of the alternative object encodings: the accusative signals that
the object referent is involved in a polarly (more) opposed manner, and the dative
(or perhaps certain prepositions) that the object referent is involved in a less, and
certainly not in a polarly, opposed manner.

These meanings are equally relevant for syntagmatic object differentiation in
Old English, as illustrated in (28)-(33). They provide a uniform explanation

of the dative-accusative and accusative-accusative patterns observed.[42]
Verbs such as læran, beniman, reafian, tiþian, gifian/geofian, weorpan
accordingly do not lexically stipulate which of their object roles is
to be represented as polar opposite of the subject: both object roles
may alternatively be assigned this status (encoded by the accusative),
with the other object then being less opposed (dative) or circumstantial
(receiving semantic-role encoding), or both objects may also be inter-
preted as equally opposed to the subject (cp. 28b, 29d). Depending
on these opposedness choices, the semantic relationships among the
three interacting roles usually have to be conceptualised somewhat
differently, as indicated by the Modern English translations of the
Old English verbs (teaching vs. exhorting/persuading/recommending (28),
depriving vs. taking-away-from (29), robbing vs. seizing (30), giving/be-
stowing vs. endowing/enriching/honouring (32)). Not fully accounted for
so far, as a result of our concentration on the dative and accusative,
are the frequent alternations between the accusative and the genitive
or some prepositional marking with verbs of taking away and, more
rarely, of giving (cp. tiþian (31), gifian/geofian (32)), which are
sometimes independent of the status of the co-occurring dative or
accusative object (cp. beniman (29)). Another question requiring
further study is whether verbs such as those in (28)-(33) indeed are
doubly incomplete (i.e. bitransitive) in all their occurrences, hence
require two non-circumstantial object roles, or whether some genitive,
prepositional or instrumental-dative (cp. weorpan (33)) objects rather
are verb-independent, i.e. circumstantial.

Much further evidence could be adduced clearly favouring the present analysis
of the Old English dative-accusative case opposition, based on the notion of objects
differentiated as to their degree of opposedness, over an analysis relying on the concept
of lexical case government. It is, for instance, hardly a coincidence that objects in
relationships characterised above as prototypical examples of polar opposedness, viz.
objects created and annihilated, quite consistently appear in the accusative: wyrcan,

scieppan, areren, timbr(i)an, smiðian etc., when used as verbs of creation, never
occur with the effected object in the dative;[43] and, analogously, the object denoting
the victim with verbs of killing (such as (a)dydan, (a)cwellan, (a)stirfan, fordon,
(for)spillan, (for/of)myrþrian, forfaran, forwegan, ofbeatan, slihtan, abradwian,
(a/be/of)fyllan, (of/for)slean, to quote only a tiny selection) is also as a rule in
the accusative. Furthermore, with 'impersonal' verbs of sensation (such as (ge)hreowan
'rue/repent/grieve', geyflian 'become ill', sceamian 'feel shame', hyngrian 'feel/be
hungry', þyrstan 'feel/be thirsty') the role of the participant experiencing the
sensation, if not construed as subject, characteristically varies between dative and
accusative encoding. This could be due to an indeterminacy
in the interpretation of the opposedness status of this role: even if no external cause
of the sensation is mentioned, or is mentioned in a circumstantial role, the experiencer
may be conceived of as being more or less completely under the influence of,
and as more or less totally affected by, the sensation itself.

On the present analysis, the kind of object-case variation ob-
served need not be interpreted as indicating that the case system already
is in complete disarray. The accusative-dative opposition on the con-
trary appears to be functioning extremely well. The obvious question to
ask then is why this case system nevertheless disappeared in the not too
distant future, and why in Modern English at the latest objects ceased
to be differentiated morphosyntactically according to their degrees of
opposedness. (While not surviving as an overt morphosyntactic category,
opposedness distinctions arguably remain relevant as a covert, lexically
expressed category.) Interestingly, Jacob Grimm (1837: 684) speculates that a
diminishing emphasis on distinctions of objectiveness was one of the factors responsible
for the decay of morphological case systems in Germanic languages. And one must
indeed agree that the disappearance of object case marking cannot entirely be
attributed to phonetic attrition of case endings, for otherwise it would be difficult
to understand why there are no longer genitival objects of verbs in English, the
genitive marker being preserved perfectly well. But, rather than boldly asserting with Grimm
that objectiveness/opposedness differentiations for some reason or other simply lost importance,
it might seem plausible to assume that case morphology in late Old English in fact was

disarrayed, as a result of the intensive contact with the Old Norse of the Scandinavian invaders. With the means of expressing opposedness differentiation in disorder or even disappearing, a radical, but perhaps unavoidable, solution may have been to completely reorganise the system of predicate-participant role relationships, undermining the semantic principles ~~underlying~~ object-case marking, and ultimately leading to the abandonment of the remnants of nominal object-case morphology.

To return to the main theoretical theme of this paper: If a language can be shown to differentiate argument configurations according to their degree of opposedness, its morphosyntax reflecting this differentiation in one way or another (say, in an accusative-dative case opposition, as in Old English), is this reason enough for us to recognise direct (more, polarly opposed) and indirect (less, non-polarly opposed) objects as grammatical relations in this language, in addition to semantic circumstantial-role relations? Definitely not, since what is being differentiated are semantic types of objects, just as in the case of semantic transitivity or semantic role distinctions. It seems ~~clear~~, however, that semantic differentiation according to degrees of opposedness is an essential prerequisite for the recognition of grammatical relations traditionally distinguished, in certain languages, as direct and indirect objects. The following chapter will, therefore, be devoted to an examination of the additional conditions under which more (polarly) and less (non-polarly) opposed objects may acquire a new, grammatical status.

3. On having direct and/or indirect objects

3.1. We have so far rejected, for languages like Old English, the notion of lexical object-case government, or, more generally, the assumption that it is exclusively the predicate which determines the encoding of its (non-circumstantial) objects, unless indirectly, if the encoding rules refer to semantic participant roles implied by predicates or to distinctions between circumstantial and non-circumstantial roles likewise determined by predicates. This is not to say ~~however~~ that predicates could be entirely disregarded as determinants of the differential status of objects;

the suggestion merely is that predicates alone do not, or do not necessarily, lexically specify this status. It is true, we have/above\mentioned/examples of predicates which, if conceptualised appropriately, imply relationships between their core arguments almost by necessity and unalterably either of the polar (e.g. killing, destroying, creating, hearing) or of the non-polar (e.g. obeying, thanking, being pleased with) opposedness type. But these object statuses in such instances are not due to arbitrary lexical properties of predicates; rather the respective relational meanings of such predicates are compatible only with polarly or non-polarly opposed arguments. If two participants, for example, are not seen as diametrically opposed to one another, the relationship they are involved in could hardly be that of killer-victim (presupposing an incomplete predicate to denote this relationship). It should have become clear from the preceding chapter (§ 2.5) that predicate meanings may also be such as to be compatible with quite different kinds of relationships (especially opposedness relationships) among their arguments. What I would like to suggest now is that the inherent lexical specificity of predicates with regard to the opposedness relationship of their arguments is a parameter according to which languages which do differentiate objects semantically may vary. This parameter, it seems, has to do with the constitution of relations which are no longer purely semantic and lexically ungoverned, and which may be termed direct and indirect object.

To see on what kind of considerations this suggestion is based, it is instructive
(20)
to draw again on the Old English verb hieran/and to compare it with its translation
equivalents in German, another language with semantic opposedness differentiation of objects.

(34) a. ne mæg nan mon twæm hlafordum hieran - niemand kann zwei Herren
dienen/gehorchen; þa noldan Crecas þæim bebode hieran - da wollten
die Griechen diesem Befehl nicht folgen/gehorchen (cp. also with prep-
ositional object: ... nicht auf diesen Befehl hören, or with accusative
object, but a different verb form: ... nicht diesen Befehl befolgen); inc
hyraþ eall - alles soll euch beiden gehören/gehorchen/untertan sein

b. ær he domdæges dyn gehyre - ehe er den Lärm des Jüngsten Gerichts
hörte; þa þæt se ealdormon hierde - als der Älteste das hörte (or with
prepositional object: ... davon hörte); gif þu wilt gehyran þone
apostol - wenn du den Apostel anhörst (or with prepositional object:
auf den Apostel hörst); gehyr mine stefne - höre mich an/erhöre mein

Flehen; hieran 'hear judicially' - anhÖren/(with personal object) verhÖren

c. se port hyrþ in on Dene - der Hafen gehÖrt den DÜnen (also with prepositional object, especially if non-personal: gehÖren zu)

Just as in Old English, the dative-accusative case opposition in German can be interpreted as encoding differences in degree of opposedness:[44] objects diametrically opposed to their subjects are in the accusative in both languages (34b), and the dative is used for objects less than polarly opposed (34a, c). However, whereas in Old English the same verb, hieran, is used with polar and non-polar objects, different verbs, hÖren/anhÖren/erhÖren/verhÖren vs. gehorchen/dienen/folgen/ gehÖren (not considering prepositional objects), have to be employed in German, depending on the polarly or non-polarly opposed status of the object. In other words, the German verbs hÖren/anhÖren/erhÖren/verhÖren on the one hand, and gehorchen/dienen/folgen/gehÖren on the other, unlike hieran, are not free to occur with polar and non-polar opposites, but lexically stipulate that their respective objects can only be of one particular type, and in this sense they can be said to govern more (polarly) or less (non-polarly) opposed objects. This is not tantamount to saying that they arbitrarily govern the accusative or dative case: the assignment of these cases can still be considered to be contingent on the semantics of role oppositions, irrespective of which particular predicates object roles co-occur with .. One might object that the verbs at issue, German hÖren, anhÖren, gehorchen, gehÖren, folgen etc. and Old English hieran 'hear/obey/ listen to ...' (or hieran$_1$, hieran$_2$ ...) simply differ in lexical meaning and that it is therefore natural that they should occur with different types of objects. But this would in no way be a valid objection since one essential lexical difference between these verbs precisely consists in their being compatible or not with participant role configurations of the polar or non-polar opposedness type. That is, all these verbs in German and Old English have a common basic meaning, or belong to a single semantic verb field, and the impression that the individual German verbs are lexically more specific than their Old English counterpart hieran is essentially due to the fact that they inherently require their arguments to be either in polar or non-polar opposition.

There are verbs in German as well which more or less freely combine with certain participant roles conceived of as more or less opposed:

(35) a. jemanden rufen 'to call/summon someone (Acc)' vs. jemandem rufen 'to call/shout to someone (Dat)'

    b. der Kopf schmerzt mich vs. mir lit. 'the head aches me (Acc/Dat)' (cp. also: mein Kopf schmerzt 'my head aches')

    c. jemanden vs. jemandem das Bild sehen lassen 'to let someone (Acc/Dat) see the picture' (case alternation possible only with causatives of certain two-place verbs)

But this is clearly the minority pattern.[45] With most predicates it is lexically predetermined whether an object has to be seen as more or as less opposed to the subject. And since the basic (field) meanings of many predicates are ~~compatible~~ compatible with argument configurations of different degrees of opposedness, it is not surprising that we should frequently find verb pairs the members of which differ only with respect to the lexical determination of an object as more or less opposed. The members of such verb pairs may be formally unrelated, but perhaps more frequently they turn out to be morphologically transparent variants. The few examples in (36) and (37) must suffice to illustrate this.

(36) a. jemanden unterstützen 'to support someone (Acc)' vs. jemandem helfen 'to help/give help to someone (Dat)'; jemanden/etwas meiden 'to avoid someone/something (Acc)' vs. jemandem/etwas ausweichen 'to give way to someone/something, parry something (Dat)'

    b. jemanden/etwas bedienen 'to serve/wait on/attend on someone, operate/ manipulate/handle something (Acc)' vs. jemandem/etwas dienen 'to serve/ be a servant to/perform duties for/be of service to someone/something (Dat)'; jemanden/etwas verfolgen 'to pursue/persecute/chase/prosecute/trace/trail someone/something (Acc)' and etwas befolgen 'to comply with/take (an advice)' vs. jemandem folgen 'to follow/succeed/obey someone (Dat)'; jemanden/etwas (be-)schädigen 'to damage someone/something (Acc)' vs. jemandem schaden 'to harm someone (Dat)'; etwas beantworten 'to answer something (Acc)' vs. jemandem antworten 'to reply to someone (Dat)'

(37) a. jemandem ein Amt nehmen 'to take an office (Acc) from someone (Dat)' jemanden eines Amtes entheben/entbinden 'to dismiss/remove someone

(Acc) from office (Gen)'; jemandem etwas beibringen 'to impart/teach
something (Acc) to someone (Dat)' vs. jemanden in etwas unterrichten
'to instruct/teach someone (Acc) in something' (cp. also with equally
opposed objects: jemanden etwas lehren 'to teach someone (Acc) some-
thing (Acc)'

b. jemandem etwas liefern 'to deliver something (Acc) to someone (Dat)'
vs. jemanden mit etwas beliefern 'to supply someone (Acc) with some-
thing'; jemandem etwas rauben 'to rob something (Acc) from someone
(Dat)' vs. jemanden um etwas berauben 'to rob someone (Acc) of some-
thing'; etwas auf etwas werfen 'to throw something (Acc) at something'
and jemandem etwas zuwerfen 'to throw something (Acc) to someone (Dat)'
vs. jemanden/etwas mit etwas bewerfen 'to pelt someone/something (Acc)
with something'

I have tried to bring out the semantic differences between these verb pairs and their
opposedness relationships in the English translations. In order to fully
justify the contention that the essential distinctive feature is that accusative objects
are invariably more opposed to subjects than dative objects, a more extensive
analysis of such verbs would be required, focussing attention in particular on their
typical contexts of occurrence. Rather than attempting an empirical validation
along such lines, let me point out that in Old English a quite similar situation is
found with a number of verbs, different opposedness relationships
being tied up with different verb forms:

(38) a. Him wæs ful boren (Beow.) 'to him (Dat) the cup (Nom) was borne',
Deoflum onsægdnesse bær (Ælfred, Bede) 'to the devils (Dat) he brought
the oblations/Host (Acc)' vs. Gif man mannan wæpnum bebyreþ (L. Ethb.)
'if one supply a man (Acc) with weapons (Dat)'

b. Ge on his wergengan wite legdon (Solomon & Saturn) 'you imposed pain
(Acc) upon his pilgrim', Hi ðec gelegdon on laþne bend (Cædmon)
'they laid on you the loathsome band (Acc)', He wæs unscyldig ðæs
ðe him geled wæs (OE Chron.) 'he was guiltless of that which (Nom)
was laid to him (Dat)' vs. We hine clommum belegdon (Legend St
Andrew) 'we loaded him (Acc) with chains (Dat)', Hi ðe witum belecgaþ
(Legend St Andrew) 'they afflict you (Acc) with torments (Dat)'

c. Sprænge se mæssepreost haligwæter ofer hig ealle (L. Ath.) 'the

mass-priest should sprinkle holy water (Acc) over them all' vs.

Besprengc hyne mid ðam wætere (AS Herbarium) 'besprinkle him

(Acc) with the water'; but notice that target role may be represented

as polar opposite also with the basic verb without be–: He nam ðæt

blod and sprengde ðæt folc (Ælfric, Exodus) 'he took the blood and

sprinkled the people (Acc)'

In Old English, however, this is the minority pattern compared to the free

variability of object-case marking independently of the predicate, as illustrated and

discussed in §§ 2.3 and 2.5. The Old English verbal prefix be– in particular is less

strictly associated with alternations of opposedness relationships, with the great

majority of pertinent verbs, than its German counterpart.[46]

Superficial though our comparison of Old English and German may have been,

it enables us to attempt now a characterisation of the relations of direct and

indirect object, if these additional concepts are supposed to refer to a level

of relational organisation present in languages like German (with the majority of incomplete predicates,

that is), but absent with the majority of incomplete predicates in Old English and other

languages of its kind. Given that a language differentiates objects in non-circum-

stantial semantic roles as more or less opposed, an argument may be said to be in the relation of

direct object if it is predetermined by the predicate to be involved in a more (polarly)

opposed role relationship, and an argument may be said to be in the relation of indirect object if

the predicate requires it to assume the status of a less (non-polarly) opposed participant.

It ought to be obvious from the preceding section that, strictly speaking, these additional

lexically governed relations may be defined only with respect to individual predicates.

But it seems plausible to assume that the predicate conceptualisations in a given

language tend to be uniform to a certain extent, so that, if grammatical regularities

have to be formulated in terms of direct and indirect objects (rather than simply in terms

of 'more/less opposed object'), they are applicable to a reasonably large

group of predicates. We have been presupposing that opposedness degrees are differentiated

both paradigmatically and syntagmatically; but it is

an empirical question whether one kind of object differentiation (no matter whether

free or lexically governed) is possible without the other (so that direct and indirect

objects could be manifest either only in one-object clauses or only in two-object

clauses), or whether there perhaps exists an implicational relationship between

paradigmatic and syntagmatic object differentiation (so that the existence of direct and indirect objects in one-object clauses would imply their existence in two-object clauses as well, or vice versa). Patterns such as those in (39) (German) and (40) (Japanese) may be found in a great number of languages,

(39) a. <u>jemanden (be-)zahlen</u> 'to pay someone (Acc)'

b. <u>den Lohn (be-)zahlen</u> 'to pay the wages (Acc)'

c. <u>jemandem/*jemanden den Lohn (be-)zahlen</u> 'to pay someone (Dat/*Acc) the wages (Acc)'

(40) a. <u>Sensei ga gakusei o osieru</u> 'the teacher teaches the student'

b. <u>Sensei ga Nihon-go o osieru</u> 'the teacher teaches Japanese'

c. <u>Sensei ga gakusei ni/*o Nihon-go o osieru</u> 'the teacher teaches the student Japanese'

and ~~it is tempting to expect on such grounds~~ that objects tend to be differentiated primarily syntagmatically even if the same participant roles are not differentiated paradigmatically.[47] ~~But an empirical resolution of such issues would be beyond the scope of the present rather elementary study.~~ One other point yet ought to be made here: The grammaticalisation, or rather lexicalisation, of object differentiation may entail a decrease in semantic transparency of the opposedness status of objects. But in particular if morphologically related verb pairs as exemplified in (36)-(38) are available, the predicate-governed relations of direct and indirect object can be expected to still reflect ~~the~~ the semantic basis that motivates the differentiation of objects in the first place.

If the criterion for the recognition of direct and indirect objects is that predicates assign to particular arguments specific opposedness values, this raises a question which is analogous to the one asked in the case of subjectivity (cp. Plank 1980a): Is the choice of lexically predetermined more or less opposed objects an entirely arbitrary decision, to be dealt with in terms of unpredictable properties of individual lexical items, or a decision in accordance with certain general principles? We have earlier referred to the assumption (of Fillmore and others) that at least 'direct object' is a formal rather than purely notional category, and we can now agree that this is correct insofar as direct-objecthood, in the present conceptual framework, is not

defined in terms of 'notional' participant roles such as patient, recipient, and the like. But this assumption is not correct insofar as the grammatical concept of direct-objecthood is not of a purely formal character, but definitely has semantic content, viz. 'high degree of opposedness', by virtue of its systemic interlocking with the concept of indirect-objecthood, whose semantic content is 'lower degree of opposedness'. In the absence of this systemic opposition, i.e. if a language only distinguishes direct objects from non-direct objects in the sense of the distinction between non-circumstantial and circumstantial participant roles, and thus does not emphasise morphosyntactically the differentiation according to degrees of opposedness, it is likely that the category of direct object (or rather, non-circumstantial object) will have less notional content; that is, we could then expect semantic-role con-figurations to be construable as subject – direct object relationships without the participants involved being much opposed to each other.[47]

In languages which do differentiate direct and indirect objects, if there are regularities of direct- and indirect-object selection, these must primarily refer to the semantic content of these relations rather than to participant-role types à la Fillmore (1968) per se.[48] The regularities we may accordingly expect to uncover would seem to be extremely general indeed: all we need to say by way of stating them is, perhaps, that whenever a predicate implies a relationship where two arguments can conceivably be regarded as strongly, if not polarly, opposed, the argument which is not chosen as subject (of a basic construction) is a potential candidate for the status of direct object (and, mutatis mutandis, for indirect objects). The essential point of reference is therefore always the relational meaning of the predicates of a language. Suppose we have a predicate denoting the activity of killing in roughly the same manner as the English verb to kill, the argument referring to the victim would then quite obviously seem to be a much better candidate for the status of polar opposite of the killer than what-ever instrumental role may also be involved in the event. However, given a predicate meaning roughly 'use-for-killing', the instrument would presumably outrank the victim as preferred candidate for being seen as polarly opposed to the killer ('he used-for-killing a knife on the duckling'). Situations, especially dynamic ones, are complex entities, usually consisting of several phases, and

predicates, following a principle of pars pro toto representation, often focus only

on a single phase in order to identify the entire situation — although there may be

languages, those employing serial verb constructions, which tend to paint piecemeal

pictures of dynamic situations, focussing on all phases individually.[49] Depending on

which particular phase of a situation is strictly speaking denoted by the predicate

(in the case of a killing, the initial phase: planning and preparing the act, grasping

a suitable instrument, approaching the victim — middle phase: moving the instrument
and perhaps most salient
and using it on the victim — final phase: effecting a dramatic change of state of the

victim, to give a very summary breakdown), different participants may have better

chances of being seen as polarly opposed (in a killing, perhaps the killer and an

instrument in the intitial phase, and the killer and the victim in the latter stages).

Since the categories of aspect and 'Aktionsart' apparently have something to do

with phasing in linguistic representations of situations, it would not be surprising

if they also correlate with the selection of objects. Although the regularities of

direct- and indirect-object selection are in a sense always predicate-specific,

wider generalisations are no doubt possible on the basis of more abstract classifications

of the kinds of relationships potentially expressed by predicates. Thus, a great

number of predicates, in a great number of languages, presumably have in common

that they are compact renderings of cause-effect relationships, i.e. that they

represent a relationship between two events, the cause-event and the effect-event,

as a single situation involving as participants the protagonists of the cause- and

the effect-events (e.g. 'the farmer's acting in a particular way caused the dying

of the duckling' is represented as 'the farmer killed the duckling').[50] And such

configurations, no matter which particular predicate occurs in them, appear to

be prototypical instances of polar opposedness/direct-objecthood, especially if

the participant experiencing the effect thereby undergoes a noticeable change of

state or location. A further general, though not unrelated, factor would seem to

be that the chances of an argument to be seen as a polar opposite increase with

the extent to which its referent is involved in, or affected/effected by, an event,

again no matter which particular predicate it is employed with. For example, the

relationship between a person and the place where he happens to live or stay is

not normally regarded as one of polar opposedness; but if the relationship of

'living-in/staying-at' holds between persons and the domicile they fully occupy,

it is much likelier to count as one of polar opposites.

This brings us to an important point where our account of direct/indirect-
objecthood needs to be elaborated. It was claimed above that more and less
opposed objects acquire the status of direct and indirect objects if the semantic
differentiations are lexically predetermined; and this would imply that the
semantic factors that were just mentioned as quite generally contributing to
the opposedness value of argument configurations (e.g. change of state/location,
total involvement) also have to be lexically assigned to particular arguments
if the relations held by these arguments are to count as more than purely semantically
distinct object relations. But this might be too strong a requirement. Instead, it
seems reasonable to assume, just as in the case of predicate-determined subject
selection, that given a particular predicate, the statuses of more and less opposed
object are not necessarily assigned to individual arguments once and for all, but
may be assignable to different arguments at different times, to the arguments, that
is, which under the given circumstances are the best candidates for the different
opposedness statuses. However, this looks like the situation where we have a purely
semantic differentiation of types of objects independent in principle of the predicate.
What is needed in addition, I submit, is a distinction between unmarked (or basic)
and marked object selection, which is again reminiscent of a distinction we have
had to draw when dealing with the grammatical relation of subject (Plank 1980a).
If a language is grammatically/lexically object-differentiating, its predicates
cannot be neutral with regard to the opposedness status of their arguments — but
they would not be neutral if they designated particular arguments merely as
lexically preferred, rather than as absolutely obligatory, polar or not-so-polar
opposites, allowing for the possibility that other arguments not so designated
may assume these statuses in their stead in a marked construction. Since the choices
of direct/more opposed and indirect/less opposed object would still be governed
by predicates, on a preferential rather than categorical basis, we would expect
the markedness of a construction, i.e. the choice of an argument as direct/indirect
object which is not the lexically preferred candidate for the respective relations,
to be in fact registered by the predicate. If we now recall the German examples
presented in (36) and (37), where the same arguments are alternatively construed as direct

or indirect objects, we notice that in many cases (36b, 37b) we do not get entirely
different verbs corresponding to the different choices of direct/indirect object, but
rather basis and morphologically marked, i.e. prefixed (be-, ver-) and suffixed (-ig),
verbs. And these examples could easily be multiplied; and analogous verb-marking
systems are found in other languages which also differentiate the grammatical relations
of direct and indirect object.[51] Such verb-marking systems are exactly what we
would expect to find if predicates determine a preferred choice of arguments as
direct/more opposite and indirect/less opposite object without excluding the
possibility that other arguments, provided they have the appropriate semantic
properties (e.g. denote the participant undergoing a change of state/location or
being totally involved), may assume these relations instead.

A final remark is in order concerning the relationship between subject, direct
object, and indirect object. In much recent, and not so recent, work these gram-
matical relations have been assumed to be hierarchically ordered, with subjects
ranking higher than direct objects which in turn rank higher than indirect objects.[52]
On the other hand, there have been attempts to oppose direct objects, as the
objects par excellence, to both subjects and indirect objects.[53] In particular
the hierarchy 'subject > direct object > indirect object' has often been taken
for granted, for the purpose of accounting for the differential accessibility of
these relations to morphosyntactic operations, in the case of languages where
the indirect-object relation cannot be defined, and the hierarchical ordering
assumed, therefore, did not always necessarily pertain to truly grammatical
relations (see Faltz 1978 for discussion). For languages which indeed do manifest
these three grammatical relations, the conceptual framework developed in the
present paper and in Plank (1980a) would surely justify the ranking of subjects:
by virtue of their pragmatic primehood properties subjects are the primary gram-
matical relation. Both types of object have in common that they usually are not
the actual pragmatic primaries. But if direct and indirect objects are to be ranked
relative to subjects, the present account would suggest that direct rather than
indirect objects are most distant from subjects: they are more/polarly opposed to
subjects, whereas indirect objects are less than polarly opposed to arguments in
the primary grammatical relation. And if subject referents are typically animates,

if not persons, this would also make them similar to indirect- rather than direct-object referents: personhood or individuality can be shown to be a factor predestinating an argument for the status of non-polar opposite (or 'less objective' object, in Jacob Grimm's terminology). Therefore, if morphosyntactic operations should turn out to identify subjects and direct objects, as opposed to indirect objects, a different explanation would seem to be called for than the one referring to a relational hierarchy.

3.2. In our account of direct/indirect-object differentiation almost no attention was paid to eventual pragmatic ingredients of these relations, and I think this neglect is essentially justifiable — at least for languages like the Standard Average European case languages, where the relations that can plausibly be distinguished as direct and indirect object no doubt have a predominantly semantic substratum. Now, it has often been observed, especially in connection with so-called dative-shift or indirect-object advancement constructions (cp. *He gave a farmer it; What did he give you? - *He gave a duckling to me), that certain informational-pragmatic constraints must be observed in selecting and ordering objects; and it has been suggested (e.g. by Givón 1979, ch. 4) that the grammatical relation 'direct object', if it can be defined in a language, has an essentially pragmatic rationale: after the subject, the direct object ranks highest in relative focusworthiness (topicality), whereas non-direct objects are predestined to serve the purpose of new activation and/or commenting (cp. also Dik 1978). And remember also that it was briefly suggested above (§ 2.5) that any predicate-governed participant role, including that of direct object, might be predestined to occur in the commentative part of utterances. But where would indirect objects fit in this pragmatic picture? Could it be that some languages further differentiate non-direct objects, with indirect objects ranking higher in informational-pragmatic status than other non-direct objects? Or could it be that some languages have an indirect-object relation even outranking that of direct object in pragmatic primehood privileges? We shall have to return to this issue of the possibility of a syntagmatic differentiation of objects in pragmatic terms elsewhere (Plank 1981); but for the time being I only wish to emphasise this: the fact that different arguments of a predicate may have different pragmatic statuses per se is no sufficient reason to recognise different

grammatical relations. If with <u>give</u>, for example, the arguments referring to the receiver and to the thing given may alternatively be the focus of attention and/or previously activated (perhaps together with the subject), their encoding (order, preposition) and other morphosyntactic potential may depend on their actual pragmatic statuses and/or on their semantic roles, rather than on their being in particular grammatical object relations assumed to be definable without proof.

Notes

[1] Animacy, however, is not the only factor determining the use and non-use of _a_ in Spanish; also relevant are e.g. the relative positions of subject and object (if the object precedes the subject, it is marked with _a_ even if inanimate), and the presence of another non-subject marked with _a_ (such as a recipient object, in which case the patient object lacks _a_ even if human). For details see García (1975). These complicating factors per se still would not seem to demand that the distribution of _a_ be stated in terms of grammatically differentiated object relations.

[2] Although such informational-pragmatic factors as definiteness and activation could play a role here in favouring one or the other of the alternative constructions.

[3] With the verb _present_ this prepositionless construction is perhaps not entirely impossible, although it is definitely archaic in present-day English; Shakespeare still has such constructions (cp. _I thrice presented him a kingly crown_). But there are other verbs otherwise similar to _present_ which do not occur in a prepositionless construction (e.g. _credit_).

[4] Fillmore (1968:48) also alludes to "focussing" as a determinant of direct-object selection. Similarly, Dik (1978, ch. 5) characterises the grammatical relation of (direct) object as "further specifying a perspective": "Subj and Obj assignment can be said to define an unambiguous path through the state of affairs designated by the underlying predication" (1978:73). Even if these notions of 'second perspective' and 'path' could be given a reasonable interpretation, I doubt whether a differentiation of objects (vis-à-vis non-objects) as truly grammatical relations could be achieved along these lines. See also §3.2.

[5] Cp. Blinkenberg (1960, part 1) for a survey of previous related work, Lyons (1968: §8.2), and most recently Hopper & Thompson (1980), which provides the point of departure of the present discussion.

[6] Individuation, according to Hopper & Thompson (1980), is itself a complex notion comprising such factors as humanness/animacy, concreteness, singularity, countability, referentiality/definiteness. Cp. also Ammann (1961:83ff.) for an

earlier account of 'good' direct objects in terms of determinateness. The nominals in constructions like to play football/piano are good examples of a very low degree of individuation, and under such circumstances one typically finds object incorporation in languages which have such constructions (cp. Sapir 1911, Mardirussian 1975).

[7] Sauvageot (1971) discusses a number of Uralic languages where the expression of objects varies with many individual transitivity factors, and concludes that in these languages there is no unitary relation of (direct) object. But if 'direct (transitive) object' is seen as a scalar concept, this variability would not come as a surprise.

[8] Nominal objects likewise tend to be employed in less transitive clauses — which might account for the fact that -end-participles in Old English and later -ing forms often occur with objects marked differently (i.e. with the genitive or of) than in the case of the corresponding truly verbal predicate forms; cp. Visser (1970:357f.).

[9] Although one also finds analyses where different kinds of objects in one-object clauses (say, accusative, dative, and genitive objects in Standard Average European languages) are not distinguished as direct and non-direct/indirect.

[10] Cp. e.g. Hopper & Thompson (1980:§2.3), Hawkinson & Hyman (1974), Morolong & Hyman (1977), Faltz (1978).

[11] Cp. Moravcsik (1978:§2.3) for pertinent data from these and other languages.

[12] See, for instance, Gary & Keenan (1977), Gary (1977), Kisseberth & Abasheikh (1977), Duranti & Byarushengo (1977).

[13] Cp. e.g. Delbrück (1893: 360), where 'object' is claimed to be one of the notions which "in der Grammatik nicht weiter zu definieren, sondern als Realitäten anzuerkennen [sind] , welche in der Anschauung der Sprechenden vorhanden sind". And cp. also contemporary Relational Grammar.

[14] The Old English data used in this paper are mostly culled from Visser (1970), Bosworth & Toller (1898), and Toller & Campbell (1972). (The abbreviations identifying the text sources of the examples may therefore not always be uniform.) Some pertinent data, although mostly from the same sources, may also be found in Penhallurick (1975), which offers a good critique of recent and not-so-recent accounts of case assignment in Old English.

15 We have to do here with a metalinguistic comment, not with two referents, he_1 and he_2.

16 Note the negation in the second conjunct. In the preceding section negation was claimed to be a factor decreasing clausal transitivity. In Old English negation (or perhaps rather privation) obviously correlates with the genitive (cp. later examples such as (29) or (30), or one-object clauses such as ic wille geswigian þara mandæda (Ælfred, Oros.) 'I will refrain from mentioning the evil deeds (Gen)' (but swigian also occurs with accusative objects)); but I doubt that it also influences, even statistically, dative-accusative alternations in such one-object clauses as (16).

17 The realis/irrealis distinction is another one of the transitivity factors mentioned above; but its influence on dative-accusative alternations in Old English would again seem to be spurious.

18 And also of other early Germanic languages, such as Gothic (see van der Meer 1901, Winkler 1896).

19 Some Beowulf commentators (e.g. Klaeber) assume that feorhgeniþlan represents a dative, rather than accusative, plural, there being a number of clear cases of dative plural nouns in Beowulf no longer appearing with the distinctive ending -um. Semantically, as will be shown in §2.5, an accusative would be perfectly appropriate here. It is nevertheless remarkable that a number of Old English verbs meaning 'to chase/persecute' (e.g. fylgean, oferfylgan, ehtan, hentan) quite often occur with dative, genitive, or prepositional objects, suggesting perhaps that their basic meaning is something like 'to seek/strive for/(attempt to) seize', since with verbs of such meaning non-accusative, especially genitive, objects are quite common.

20 It may be assumed that the passive nominative would correspond to an active accusative.

21 When tiþian occurs with a single object, what is being granted/consented to may also be construed as a dative object as well as a genitive or accusative object: He bæd ða heafodmenn þæt hi his benum getiþodon (Ælfric, Saints' Lives) 'he asked the leaders that they should grant/consent to his requests/prayers (Dat)'.

22 Assumed to be accusative, although me is strictly speaking no distinctively accusatival form.

23 This passage is occasionally translated as 'he then dashed water on/over him', which I assume is incorrect (the person undergoing this treatment is apparently half dead, and the purpose of the treatment is not to drown him but to revive him!), although it could account for the accusative encoding of the patient in terms of 'thorough involvement'.

24 Although the instrumental nouns in this and the preceding example are clearly singular in the Latin Vorlage, they can perhaps be interpreted as not highly individuated or even as denoting some material rather than specific pieces of stone (cp. also example 33c), which could account for their not being construed as accusative objects of weorpan.

25 Grimm in fact deals with object-case assignment under the heading of "Verbalrection", which is rather unfortunate since his point is precisely that verbs per se do not strictly speaking govern the dative, accusative, and genitive object-cases in the older Germanic languages.

26 Many, but by no means all, verbs listed under the rubric 'causative objects' by Visser (1970: §§ 370-392) would be relevant here. For these verbs Visser's term 'causative objects' seems quite appropriate. Cp. also Ammann (1961) for a good characterisation of the "Grundbedeutung" of the genitive.

27 Grimm's position here may be compared with García's (1975:51f.) distinction between description and (subjective) comment.

28 This choice in one-object clauses is, however, claimed to be a matter of arbitrary lexical case government.

29 See also Zubin (1975, 1977) for a similar analysis of German.

30 As suggested by the name of the pertinent case, the dative. It is nevertheless a controversial issue whether this interpretation of the terms 'dative/δοτική πτῶσις' is historically correct; see de Mauro (1965).

31 Although there may well be languages which do not tolerate this kind of textual ambiguity found in German examples like Er stahl mir einen Wagen 'he stole a car from me/for me/not for me personally but on my behalf'.

32 Causatives of three-place verbs are a case in point.

33 A good survey of predicate conceptualisations, drawing on earlier typological work, may be found in Cassirer (1953: 212-48).

34 Which may be conceived of more concretely (e.g. 'goal/direction', 'patient') or more abstractly (e.g. 'with respect to', a common meaning of the accusative in Indo-European). And pragmatic organisation may of course also be relevant here.

35 See § 2.2 for brief exposition of the notion of individuation (esp. fn. 6).

36 I do not think there is any danger of circularity in referring to these typical relationships of polar opposedness in the present context.

37 For the present purpose 'intransitives' (such as 'sleep', 'come', 'die' etc.) are regarded as autonomous/non-relational. 'Existential' predicates (such as 'there was killing (going on)') represent, then, the extreme case of autonomy.

38 There may of course always exist synchronically productive rules for re-categorising autonomous predicates as incomplete and vice versa.

39 As in the previous translations, Modern English predicate expressions are used as a somewhat imperfect metalanguage for characterising approximately the differential semantics of the relationships at issue.

40 Dative-dative patterns could be instantiated as well, drawing on several varieties of 'free' datives.

41 Verbs usually translated as 'to beget' (e.g. streonan, begi(e)tan, onfon, cennan) are the only apparent exception known to me: they often, or even pre-dominantly (except cennan), occur with genitive rather than accusative objects. But probably their basic meaning is 'to gain/acquire' rather than 'to produce', so that their exceptionality is more apparent than real.

42 See Plank (1980c) for more detailed justification of this view of Modern English.

43 For some discussion of the semantic basis of object-case assignment in German see Starke (1969/70) (who presents the kind of data pointing to such a basis but then, wrongly, denies that the accusative and dative differ in meaning), Zubin (1975, 1977), and also the much-debated analyses of Weisgerber (e.g. 1958).

[44] The case alternations in (35a, b) may not even be possible in all dialects. But consider also constructions with free (i.e. not predicate-governed) alternation of dative and accusative such as jemandem/jemanden auf die Zehen treten lit. 'to step someone (Dat/Acc) on the toes', which as a rule involve an object referent inalienably possessing the referent of the prepositional argument. An enlightening analysis of this type of construction may be found in Zubin (1977), where dative objects are shown to be used if their referent is regarded as more potent, and accusative objects if less potent, which I think fits in well with our characterisation of the dative-accusative opposition in terms of degrees of opposedness (less potent objects are predestined to be more polarly opposed to potent subjects than more potent objects).

[45] Although be- and certain other prefixes have comparable grammaticalised functions (re-classifying autonomous verbs (intransitives) as incomplete (transitive), aspect/Aktionsart changes) in Old English; see, for instance, de la Cruz (1975).

[46] Winkler (1887), for instance, holds that syntagmatic differentiation is of primary importance.

[47] See again Plank (1980c) on the situation in Modern English.

[48] As in the case of subjects, Fillmore (1977) assumes that a Case Hierarchy and a Saliency Hierarchy are involved in object selection; but as far as I can see, the Saliency Hierarchy (referring to notions such as humanness, change of state/location, totality) alone would suffice as well.

[49] Cp. for instance Westermann (1930:126): "the Ewe people describe every detail of an action or happening from beginning to end, and each detail has to be expressed by a special verb: they dissect every happening and present it in its several parts, whereas in English we seize on the leading event and express it by a verb, while subordinate events are either not considered or rendered by means of a preposition, adverb, conjunction, or a prefix of the verb." See also Ballmer & Brennenstuhl (1981) for a more recent discussion of event phases and related issues.

[50] See Givón (1979:341) for discussion and further references.

[51] Compare the numerous recent studies of the phenomenon often called

'dative shift' or 'indirect object advancement'. In some of these analyses, however,
mere alternations of the linear order of objects are not clearly distinguished from predicate-
related constructional alternatives with unmarked and marked direct-object selection.
See Plank (1981) for further discussion.

[52] See, for instance, Kacnel'son (1972), Keenan & Comrie (1977), Perlmutter
& Postal (1977).

[53] Cp. e.g. Helbig's (1973: 175) discussion of dative objects as "eine Art Gegen-
subjekt", or also J. Anderson's (1977: 141ff.) arguments for the cyclic subjecthood of
indirect objects.

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